During my time at SAMS I was asked to lead a process to answer the
question, can and should women lead prayers services at SAMS. It was a long
process which involved extensive consultations with lay leaders and the
membership more generally. But I was absolutely clear that Halachah – Jewish
law – should be at the centre of the discussions, not only providing a
justification, if a justification could be found, but also determining the way
in which the question should be approached. An argument that fails to get
beyond ‘I want X’ ‘But I want Y’ can weaken a community, but an argument about
Halachah should strengthen a community not only in its relationship to Jewish
life, but also in its internal ability to get along. There is a huge amount
already written, but I never felt comfortable with the position of my teacher
Rabbi Joel Roth, for reasons detailed below. And nowhere else could I find the
sort of systematic approach I wanted to be able to share with the community at
SAMS (though my reliance on the work of Rabbi David Golinkin is considerable).
In the last 1,000 or so words of this otherwise technical article, I
offer some more general thoughts about what I refer to as the androcentrism of
classical Rabbinic Judaism. I don’t accept words like ‘sexist’ or ‘misogynist’
are appropriate when describing the entirety of the nuanced and complex
Rabbinic system, but equally I accept that this system (which I love) failed to
understand truths available in more modern times and needs radical intervention
right at the very edges of normative Halachah – on the issue of the role of
women in public Jewish life perhaps more than any other.
Can and Should Women Lead Prayer
Services at SAMS?[1]
It
is an oversimplification, but we can say that there are three tasks of a communal
leader of prayer.
- They must bring the
community together; much like a conductor would work with an orchestra.
This is in part technical; we must be brought in at the right time with
the right tune, but also it is a spiritual, emotional and an artistic
task. A great leader of prayer functions as a vessel, drawing a great spiritual
response from the community and transforming the printed words of the
Siddur into songful prayer.
- They must fulfil
certain key obligations on behalf of members of the prayer community. This
is entirely a practical issue.
- They must also serve
as our representatives before God. We, the community, stand to be judged
not only in our own right, but also in terms of who we appoint as our
leaders.
Each
role raises a different Halachic question.
- The role of
keeping the community focussed and united in their prayer raises the
question; is there something about women that distracts or otherwise makes
it impossible for them to ‘conduct’ prayers for a mixed, male and female,
community?
- The role of
fulfilling ritual obligation raises the question; are women technically
able, in the same way as men, to fulfil obligations on behalf of both male
and female members of the prayer community?
- The role of
representing a fully constituted prayer community before God raises the
twin questions; who can and should lead a prayer community consisting
of both men and women?
QUESTION 1.
is there something about women that makes it impossible for them to
‘conduct’ prayers for a mixed, male and female, community?
In
this section I consider two issues, firstly the notion that the woman is a
sexual provocation and as is therefore a distraction in prayer, secondly the
question of whether the woman’s place is in the domestic realm, away from the
public sphere of communal prayer.
Women
As Sexual Provocateurs
Is
there something sexually provocative and distracting about women, and most
especially about their voice, which needs to be kept under-cover and away from
public worship?
Rav Isaac said, ‘A handbreadth of exposed
skin, in a woman is a sexual incitement [erva]...’
Rav Hisda said, ‘A woman’s leg is a sexual
incitement…’
Samuel said, ‘A woman’s voice is a sexual
incitement, as it says, For your voice is sweet [erev]’ (Song of Songs
2:14)
Rav Sheshet said ‘A woman’s hair is a sexual
incitement.’
(Talmud Brachot 24a)
We
will have more to say about both the male-centred nature of this, and indeed
all classic Rabbinic language and also the sexualisation of women in classic
Rabbinics at a later point. At this juncture I want to consider this issue from
within the tradition. I will also focus on the most halachically problematic
issue – the woman’s voice.
The
early Rabbinic authority Hai Gaon understood prohibition on hearing a woman’s
voice [kol b’isha] as follows;
One may not recite [the Shema] while a woman
is singing... However, if one can focus on one’s prayers while she is singing
in a manner that one does not hear her and does not pay attention to her, it is
permissible [to recite the Shema].
(Otzar HaGeonim, Berachot, Peirushim 102)[2]
Hai
Gaon prohibits specifically singing, he prohibits it by any woman, but only as
a barrier to the recitation of the Shema. He also introduces the possibility of
kol b’isha losing its prohibiting power. These are all issues which need
to be clarified;
Does the
prohibition apply to all women?
The
broader context of the passage in Brachot is a discussion of the possibility of
reciting the Shema when in bed with one’s wife and so it might be thought that
the prohibition of kol b’isha applies only to one’s wife, perhaps on the
basis that since a husband is permitted, sexually, to his wife, she can
therefore distract him in ways no other woman could. However in a related Talmudic
source, we find the following comment on kol b’isha;
Shmuel said, ‘A person should have nothing to
do with women at all, whether adults or children. [Rav Nahman asked Rav
Yehuda,] would you like to send a greeting to [my wife] Yalta
(Kiddushin 70 a-b)
In
this passage the problem is someone else’s wife. This suggests that the problem
is women who are precluded from the male. And indeed the codifer Rav Falk
states that the problem is ONLY with precluded women and that permitted women,
i.e. a person’s wife does not count.
The voice of women who it is permissible to
hear [can be excluded from the classification of kol b’isha] for they do
not awaken the appetite.
(Prisha Tur EH 21:2)
Several
Medieval authorities incline in favour of a test from a person’s own feelings –
is the woman a woman who the man feels is sexually enticing? – this is the position
of the Ritva;
All is in accordance with one’s fear of
heaven, and so, in the halachah all depends on the way a man recognises
himself. Therefore if he requires prohibitive fences to curb his intentions, he
should construct them and even viewing the coloured clothing of a woman is
prohibited. But if he is aware of himself and knows that his desires are
subjugated, then it is permissible for him to look at and speak with a woman
who is an erva and to exchange warm greetings with a married woman.
(Hidushei Ha Ritba Kiddushin 82a.)
The
Ritva believes that ‘only one who is thoroughly righteous and recognises his
desires may conduct himself in such a manner… fortunate is one who conquers his
passions and toils in Torah’ but I am not sure that that it is sensible to
limit the ability to ‘withstand’ the ‘siren call’ of a woman only to expert Torah
scholars. Indeed this is noted, even in the Talmud itself.[3] According
to Cherney[4] the
relevance of how a person, subjectively, feels in ear-shot of a woman introduces
a concept of regilut – that when something that was at one time, or
could be seen as being, sexually enticing, becomes everyday, it loses it
prohibited character. This is the
position of Moshe Isserles in the leading Ashkenaz articulation of the law.
But a voice which one is accustomed to hear [kol
haregil bo] is not sexually enticing.
(SA OH 75.3)
We
will return to look at the notion of regilut – getting used to something
– later.
Singing and
other utterances
The
association with song appears to be derived from the prooftext offered in the Talmud,
a verse which concerns a singing woman, whose voice is sweet [ערב]. (Song of Songs 2:14). It should be noted
that while the word ערב – sweet –
sounds similar (ish) to ערוה – sexual
incitement – the two Hebrew words are not etymologically connected. It is a
weak proof and should be seen as an asmachta – a hook on which to hang an
issue that is already prevalent practice. That said we should note the
following specific Talmudic discussion of women in song;
Rav Yosef said, ‘when men sing and women join
in, it is licentious, when women sing and men answer, it is like raging fire in
flax.’
(Sotah 48a)
The
connection of kol b’isha to song is explicit in the Shulchan
Arukh, (Even HaEzer 21:3)[5]
However there are authorities who, based on the Kiddushin passage discussed
above, preclude all female utterances.[6] Regardless
of the specifics of kol b’isha we should note that the Medieval Rabbis
considered all forms social contact with women dangerous verging on the
unacceptable. The opening line of the just-cited chapter of the Shulchan Arukh
sets out the importance of keeping ‘men [adam] very, very far away from
women.’ (Even Haezer 21:1)
What
activities are prohibited within ear-shot?
The
passage in Brachot clearly concerns the recitation of the Shema prayer, but other
Talmudic articulations merely suggest the voice of the woman is problematic without
specifying which, if any, activities are prohibited or voided if performed within
ear-shot. Matters are made even more complex by a tradition of interpretation
that seems to fly directly against the context of the passage in Brachot.
Commenting on passage in Brachot the Rosh states;
This was not[7] said
regarding reciting the Shema rather it is forbidden to hear the voice of women.
Tosafot HaRosh (Brachot 24a)
This
is a surprising statement in view of the apparently clear language of the
Talmud itself, but since neither the Rif nor
Rambam[8]
include kol b’isha among the list of things which make saying the Shema forbidden,
we should take the Rosh’s statement as representing Halachah (perhaps since
saying the Shema is such a holy and purifying experience?) thereby understanding
kol b’isha erva as a general instruction applied to general social
interaction, not as a specific bar to specific prayers.
Does the
Prohibition Still Apply Today?
We
have already raised the possibility of a voice that does not actually entice a
man not being counted as kol b’isha, see the comments of Hai Gaon and
the Ritva above, we discuss this more fully now.
In
the thirteenth century, Ravia wrote, in the context of the full range of sexual
enticements listed in Brachot (hair, skin, voice) that the prohibition;
Applies only to those things which are not
usually revealed [shain regilut lehigalot], but it doesn’t apply to an
unmarried woman, with exposed hair because there is no licentiousness [hirhur],
and the same applies regarding her voice.
(1:76 p. 52) [9]
The
early-modern Orthodox authority, Rav Yehiel Wienberg, known as the Sridei Aish,
was asked how high a Mehitza should be. It is a question with very direct
implications for our discussion since sight of a woman’s hair is considered erva
in the same passage as the Talmud deems the voice of a woman erva. He
noted;
Hungarian [ultra-orthodox] writers were
exceptionally strict and expounded from sources that the Mehitza needed to be taller
than the height of a woman. Moreover … they prohibited going to synagogues
without such a Mehitzah, and moreover forbid women from coming to pray and held
it better that they stay in their homes. And for sure, their intentions are
good – protecting the modesty which was customary in earlier generations – but
in our time the situation has changed, and human nature has changed [nishtaneh
hamatzav vnishtanu hateviim], and if women were kept in their homes and
weren’t allowed to come to Synagogue, the Torah of Jewish life would be lost
for them totally.
(Sridei Aish 1:8 col 20)
And
so, he held, there was no need for a Mehitzah which removed sight of any female
hair. This is an extra-ordinary document, clearly sensitive to the differences
between our contemporary world and the world in which the more ancient of our
texts were written. This response is also remarkable in the way in which it
recognises a religious need to involve women in public prayer – admittedly not
as leaders – but there is a clear rejection of the notion that what goes on in
shul belongs to a male-only sphere. Weinberg also notes that, according to
ancient texts, it would be forbidden for a menstruant to come to synagogue, but
he also rides over this ancient prohibition, in the context of the High
Holydays since;
It would be a great pain [atzbon gadol]
for them, with everyone gathered inside and them standing outside. In our
time women are very sensitive to being kept far from the Synagogue. Also going
to Synagogue is, in our time, the possibility of survival of Judaism, for [men][10] and
for matriarchs.[11]
We
live in a world where the voice of women and sight of uncovered hair of even
married women is a commonplace. There may be some who are so sensitive to the
sexual potential in women that they are unable to focus on even as mighty and
holy task as prayer in the presence and/or earshot of women, but it would be
wrong to use the power of a Halachic dicta to take away the voice or presence
of women, for the sake of these troubled individuals. A man who is unable to consider
a woman’s voice or sight as anything other than a sexual enticement suffers an
affliction. He should seek medical and or psychological assistance, he should
not be protected in his affliction when this would cause atzbon gadol – great
pain – to women who feel that being de-voiced is an equivalent of being kept
outside with everyone gathered inside.
In conclusion,
on the issue of woman as sexual provocateur, I decide as follows; Kol b’isha does not prohibit the recitation of the Shema or other acts of prayer. It only applies to individual men who are, subjectively, distracted by individual women. A man who is so distracted should follow the advice of the Ritva. ‘He requires prohibitive fences to curb his intentions and he should construct them.’ It is not for the woman or the community to create fences creating divisions between all men and all women since, as the Sridei Aish has noted, ‘the situation has changed, and human nature has changed.’ The voice of a woman cannot be presumed to be a distraction in a society where we are used to it, especially when preventing women from having their voice heard in prayer would be a great pain for them and a threat to the continuity of Jewish life.
I would understand the obligations of a women distracted by the specific voice of a man in the same way.
The
Woman’s Place is in the Domestic Realm
All the honour of a Princess is internal.
(Ps 45.14)
This
verse is often understood, in orthodox settings, to suggest that the correct
realm for women is private and domestic. It should be noted that this is a
matter of hashkafah – behavioural guidance, not halachah – legal
principle, and as such it does not warrant, nor has it ever received, the sort
of legal in-depth analysis that some of our other issues warrant. That said several
points seem appropriate.
We
could enter into a sociological discussion of the advantages of having a mother
at home to cook and clean, but that would be to stray onto territory at the
edge of Rabbinic competence, I will concentrate instead on an analysis of two Bible
narratives that suggest that women have a vital roles to play in the realm of public
prayer and in the ‘House of God’.
Then Moses and the people of Israel
And Miriam the prophetess, the sister of
Aaron, took a tambourine in her hand; and all the women went out after her with
tambourines, dancing.
And Miriam answered them, ‘Sing to the Lord,
for he has triumphed gloriously; the horse and his rider has he thrown into the
sea.’
(Exodus 15)
Moses’s
song, the song of the men, is longer, or at least is recorded in far greater
depth than the song of Miriam and the women, moreover this text does not
suggest that Miriam led the men in song. That said it is evidence of a woman
active in the most public way at the single greatest moment of prayerful
celebration in the Bible.
An
even more important account of female prayer, out of the home, can be found in
the Book of Samuel. Hannah wishes for a child and therefore travels, we are
told, year after year, to the central venue for Israelite worship in that time,
Shilo.
Hanna rose up after they had eaten in Shiloh , and after they had drank. And Eli the priest sat
upon a seat by the gate post of the temple of the Lord… And it came to pass, as she continued praying before the Lord,
that Eli observed her mouth. Hanna spoke in her heart; only her lips moved, but
her voice was not heard; therefore Eli thought that she was drunk. And Eli said
to her, ‘How long will you be drunk? Put away your wine from you.’ And Hanna
answered and said, ‘No, my lord, I am a woman of a sorrowful spirit; I have
drunk neither wine nor strong drink, but have poured out my soul before the
Lord.’
(1 Samuel 1)
This
is an important text in terms of showing how women turn to prayer in the public
ritual realm, in this case in the House of God. Its importance is magnified by
the use the Rabbis made of this moving narrative.
(Talmud Brachot 31a)
Hannah,
a woman, is the model for the correct way to pray! One might suggest that this
is almost an example of the Rabbinic doctrine; deeds of ancestors serve as
guides for generations to come - maasei avot siman l’banim. This
doctrine is usually applied only to Abraham Isaac and Jacob, but here a female
ancestor (appearing in a prophetic work) inspires both men and women in the
correct way to pray.
Nor
should we consider that women wishing to attend Synagogue is a modern
‘invention.’ It is clear that women would attend the synagogue in Talmudic
times, see for one example Avodah Zara 38 a-b where we are told that a Jewish
woman may leave an idol worshiper to stir a pot on the stove while she goes to
the ‘bathhouse or synagogue’ without worrying that the food would be rendered
tainted by idolatry.[12]
A
full collection of sources, from Talmudic and medieval times, detailing women’s
regular presence, in Synagogal prayer can be found in Golinkin’s responsum.[13] He
cites sources detailing practice in Rome , Pisa , Ashkenaz and Jerusalem
In
conclusion, on the issue of a woman’s place being exclusively the domestic
realm, I recognise several important texts which suggest that women have always
played a role in public liturgy. Moreover I am particularly motivated by the
way in Hannah serves as a model for all prayer. I hold the verse, the honour
of a Princess is internal, to be irrelevant in the context of considering
who may lead congregational prayer.
QUESTION 2.
Are women technically able, in the same way as men, to fulfil
obligations of both male and female members of the prayer community?[15]
Most discussions of the ability of women to lead synagogue prayers begin with the following legal principle; if two people share an equal obligation to perform a particular religious obligation one may, in many circumstances, meet the other’s obligation by their own action. The reverse is equally true;
One who is not obligated in a thing, cannot
exempt others from their obligation.
(Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 3:8)
For
example if a room of Jews wish to eat, only one person needs to make the
appropriate blessing for everyone to eat, however a non-Jew has no obligation
to say a blessing before eating food, so their blessing would not allow a Jew
to partake of food until the (Jewish) individual made the blessing themselves.
This notion of fulfilling the obligation to say the Amidah on behalf of another person is a key function of a leader of prayer. The leader concentrates on saying the prayers accurately and if there are people in the congregation who don’t have the same facility and familiarity with the prayers, they can respond ‘amen’ and be considered as if they had prayed accurately. We therefore have to ask this question – do men and women have the same obligation to pray, or is, somehow, the obligation of men somehow different or greater than that of women?
There is a notion that women are not obligated to perform what are known as ‘positive time-bound obligations,’ (Mishnah Kiddushin 1:7) but, as we shall see, this doesn’t apply to the obligation to say the Amidah which is specifically and explicitly deemed an obligation NOT dependent on a specific time;
This notion of fulfilling the obligation to say the Amidah on behalf of another person is a key function of a leader of prayer. The leader concentrates on saying the prayers accurately and if there are people in the congregation who don’t have the same facility and familiarity with the prayers, they can respond ‘amen’ and be considered as if they had prayed accurately. We therefore have to ask this question – do men and women have the same obligation to pray, or is, somehow, the obligation of men somehow different or greater than that of women?
There is a notion that women are not obligated to perform what are known as ‘positive time-bound obligations,’ (Mishnah Kiddushin 1:7) but, as we shall see, this doesn’t apply to the obligation to say the Amidah which is specifically and explicitly deemed an obligation NOT dependent on a specific time;
Women
are obligated in tefillah, mezuzah and bircat hamazon.
You
might have thought [that tefilah] is a time-bound obligation since the
verse states I pray evening, morning and afternoon (Psalm 55), therefore
the contrary is specified.
(Mishnah
Brachot 3:3 & Talmud Bavli Brachot 20b)
It might be thought that the ‘tefilah’ referred
to here is a general obligation to articulate the praise of God, but it is
clear, not least from the following section of Rambam’s Mishneh Torah, that ‘tefilah’
in this context refers to the Amidah.
The
obligation [of tefilah] used to operate like this; a person would
beseech and pray every day and speak of the praiseworthiness of the Holy
Blessed One, and then ask for their needs to be met … And so it was from the
time of Moses until Ezra.
However
when Israel Israel
(Rambam
Mishneh Torah Laws of Tefilah 1:2-6)
Golinkin
suggests that the use of ‘all’ here specifically includes women among those who
are now compelled to fulfil their obligation to perform ‘tefilah’ by the
recitation of the Amidah.[16] This
certainly is the position of the central Halachic code, the Shulhan Aruch;
Women and slaves, although exempt from reading
“the Shema,” are obliged to pray the eighteen-blessing prayer, because
it is a positive mitzvah which does not relate to a specific time.
(OH 106:1)
Note
that this code does not use the general term of the Mishnah – tefilah,
but rather the explicit term – shmoneh esrei which cannot be understood
to mean anything other than the Amidah.
There
is however one Medieval writer who held that women might be exempt from
the recitation of the Amidah. The Magen Avraham held the Rambam only meant to oblige
women in a once-daily turning towards God, ‘in any form of words [nusah]
that a person would want,’ and when the full Amidah was fixed as specific
prayers ‘it is possible that the wise did not obligate them any
further.’[17] It seems
that the prevailing sense that women are exempt from the obligation to say the
Amidah is based on this ‘possible.’ However this seems an errantly restrictive
interpretation of the clear wording in the Shulchan Arukh and the Rambam not
only in Hilchot Tefilah, cited above, but also in his commentary on the
Mishnah.
All positive obligations that women are
obligated in; eating Matzah on the night of Pesach … and tefilah and
reading the Megillah and lighting Shabbat candles and Kiddush … for each of
them the obligation for women is like the obligation for men.
(Commentary on Mishnah Kiddushin 1:7 ed. Kafach)
There
is some discussion of whether the Amidah prayers recited on musaf or neilah
are in the same category as the more regular prayers, but, following
Golinkin,[18] I accept that
the clear inclusive language of the Rambam - ‘they
fixed the eighteen blessings … and in this way they fixed all the
blessings and prayers’ - should
be understood to include all the Amidah prayers.
In
conclusion, on the issue of whether women are able to fulfil the obligation of
men to say the Amidah, I hold that they are.
In
the course of this discussion we have raised a potential problem around the
Shema.
Recitation
of the Shema is a positive time bound obligation; a classification derived from
the verse ‘when you lie down and when you rise up.’ (Deut 6) and as the Mishnah
teaches;
Women, slaves and minors are exempt from the
recitation of the Shema and from [wearing] tefilin.
(Mishnah Brachot 3:3)
But
this does not impact on our current discussion. The leader of prayer does not
fulfil the obligation of a member of the community by reciting the Shema on
their behalf. This is an obligation which, unlike saying the Amidah, cannot be
fulfilled by another person, no matter their sex. Indeed this is also true for
the other exemption referred to in the Mishnah above. A leader of prayer cannot
exempt a member of the community by their wearing of tefilin. If you are, as a
male, obligated to wear tefilin, you must fulfil this obligation yourself and
no prayer leader, male or female, can exempt you from it by performing the obligation
on your behalf.
The
key question is not whether women are obligated to perform each and every mitzvah,
but whether there are mitzvot – obligations – that a leader of
prayer fulfils on behalf of a community that women are either not obligated to
perform or have a partial or lesser obligation than men? I hold there are no
such obligations.[19]
QUESTION 3.
who can and should lead a prayer
community consisting of both men and women?
As
noted, the role of a leader in prayer extends beyond the technical
responsibility of saying the Amidah on behalf of those who have failed to say
it accurately themselves. As Rabbinic Jews we hold that something special
happens when a prayer community is constituted. God’s presence can invoked in a
community in ways an individual cannot achieve alone. This is reflected in the
classification of several parts of the liturgy as devarim shbekedushah –
words of [special] holiness – which can only be said in a formally constituted
community.
Don’t divide the Shema [pores et Shema],[20] lead
the prayers [ovrin lifnei hatevah][21] and
don’t do the priestly blessing and don’t read from the Torah … and don’t do the
blessing for mourners or … the blessing for a groom … with less than ten.
)Mishnah Megillah 4:3)
By
the year 1000 the list of things that are only said in the presence of ten has
developed to include the kedushah and the various kaddish prayers
(Mishneh Torah Hil. Tefillah 8:4) and by the sixteenth century the barachu
has joined the list (SA OH 55.1 quoted below).
Should
Women be counted among the ‘ten’?
Before
asking whether a woman can lead a constituted prayer community, or minyan,
we need to investigate whether a woman can be counted among the ‘ten.’ While
the Mishnah, cited above, does specify the number that is required for a minyan,
it is quiet on what, if any, required characteristics a member of the minyan
should have. Should they, in particular, be men, or do women also count? The
Talmud is also silent on the issue, being preoccupied instead with a struggle
to explain the reason for the number ‘ten.’ The explanation that is offered is a
double gezerah shavah[22] – a
tradition that comparing repeated words which appear in scripture in different
contexts can have meaning.
Rav Hiya taught, we can learn this from the
repeated mention of the word ‘amongst,’ the Bible states and I [God]
will be made holy amongst the children [bnei] of Israel
(Megillah 23b)
A
verse that does indeed seem to discuss God’s vesting of the Divine presence in
some kind of community is connected first to a verse discussing Moses’ reaction
to the rebellion of Korach, and through this verse to a verse discussing God’s
reaction to the failures of the generation who left Egypt
Elsewhere
(Sanhedrin 74b) we find exactly the same Rav Hiya series of connections used in
a discussion of whether the quorum of ten in front of whom misdeeds are
considered committed b’pharhesia – in public. Is the ‘ten’ any people,
or only Jews? The Rav Hiya passage, from Megillah, is used to prove that Jews
only are meant. The discussion then checks whether Ester is considered to have
sinned in public (by allowing herself to be married to a non-Jew – Ahashueros),
only to conclude that she is exempt from sinning b’pharhesia because she
was a passive agent in the sin, she was married, she didn’t undertake any
positive action. In other words Ester, a
woman, is, in theory, held to be capable of sinning b’pharhesia – in
public. Since she, as woman, is capable of shaming God in public by any
misdeed, one might think she should be capable of proclaiming the holiness of
God in public through any merit.
Also
among those early sources silent on the need to count only men, we find the
following extract from Rambam. There is more detail here than in the Mishnah,
but again, no reference to specific requirement of maleness.
How do you do public prayer [tefilat
btzibur]? One prays in a strong voice and everyone listens, and don’t do it
with less than ten free adults [gedolim u’venei horin], and the prayer
leader is one of them.
(Mishneh Torah Hil. Tefillah 8:4)[25]
How
are we to approach this silence as to any gender requirement? We are surely safe
in assuming that, in ancient times, it was simply assumed women were not full
members of the prayer community and therefore there was no need to exclude them
by name. But note that this is an assumption made NOT on the basis of any
halachic norm or derived teaching (midrash) but rather as a reflection of
prevailing sociological conditions at the time. Women, in ancient and medieval
times were simply not considered to have a role in ‘proper’ society and therefore
frequently become invisible, not only in rabbinic texts, but in so many other
ways both inside and beyond worlds of religious ritual.
It
is in the context of this prevailing reality, I argue, that we should consider Joseph
Caro’s Shulchan Arukh, sixteenth century. Here, for the first time, we see a
shift in the language used to define the sort of person who can ‘count.’
Don’t say the kaddish with less than
ten free adult males [zecahrim benei horin gedolim]
who have two hairs, and this is the law for the kedushah and the barachu,
we don’t say them with less than ten.
(Orach Haim 55:1)
This
is the text-based origin of the notion of not counting women in ‘ten.’ The
Mishnah, Talmud and Rambam are silent. The androcentrism appears without
explanation in the Shulchan Arukh. None of the classic commentators on this
text explains the inclusion of this andocentric language and Caro himself does
not mention this new restriction in his commentary on the Tur. Again I hold
that this represents not an explicit Halachic stand, but merely the
articulation of a fifteenth/sixteenth century social reality in which women had
no role in official communal life.
The
question then becomes how should we count ‘ten’ today? It makes a great deal of
sense not to count minors, it is obvious that we should only count Jews, but is
it a true reflection of the times in which we live only to count men? I argue
no. In the world in which we live, a world where women play an equal role in
all parts of communal life, from the Prime Minister down, it is most odd to
consider that the precise legal quorum of ‘ten’ should preserve a social
reality long since abandoned in other parts of our life. There can be no doubt
that Judaism has always considered both ‘male and female’ are created in the
‘image of God.’ (Genesis 1), the time has come, indeed it came many years ago,
to acknowledge this in terms of who counts, in our attempts to stand before
God.
Of
course a more traditional perspective would scoff at the notion of using
prevailing social norms to reinterpret a text once the text specifies a
particular gender, and of course making the shift to count both men and women
represents a major change in how we count ‘ten.’ Nonetheless, I believe it
would be wrong to consider that women should not count when the ground for this
claim is itself a societal norm and not an articulated Halachic stance. I do
not make this claim for all Jewish communities. There clearly are Jewish
communities in which women do not play any role in public life, and for these
communities it is understandable that women should not count towards the ‘ten’.
But St. Albans Masorti Synagogue is not such a community. Rather we are a
community that values the public contributions of its women members in all
parts of synagogal life. We recognise women as adult independent agents – gedolot
uvanot horin – and for us to exclude women from the ‘ten’ on the basis of
the unexplained mention in the Shulchan Arukh, rather than consider the
Shulchan Arukh, Rambam and Talmud present only a reflection of a long-since
disappeared societal norm, is inappropriate.
We
have therefore created the possibility of considering women as members of the
prayer community. We now turn to consider who may lead such a community.
Who May
Lead?
The
major Talmudic discussion of how a leader is chosen from the members of the
community is in tractate Taanit, 16a. That discussion is specific to who should
serve as leader at a time of great need, but, as we shall see, the teaching is
accepted as normative practice.
And who is considered appropriate [regil]
to lead prayers [on a fast day]? Rabbi Yehudah said, ‘one who is burdened [with
a large family] and has no [means to support them], he works in the field and
his home is empty. [Moreover] their youth is unblemished, they are meek and
they are wanted by the people, they are pleasant and their voice is sweet[26] and is expert at reading
the Torah and other Biblical works and is proficient in various fields of
Rabbinic learning and is expert in every one of the blessings.
(Taanit 16a)
By
the time of the Shulchan Arukh these requirements have been codified to apply
to all prayer services;
The leader of the prayer community must be
appropriate [hagun]. What is appropriate? They should be free from sin
and never to have been the subject of gossip [motzi shem ra], not even
in their childhood. They should be humble and desired by their community. They
must look nice and have a pleasant voice and they must regularly read from the
Torah, Prophets and Writings.
(OH 53:5)
To
this list, the Mishnah Brurah adds;
Their clothes should be long, so you shouldn’t
be able to see their legs,[27] and
they should be first into the Synagogue and last out, nor should they be
foolish or frivolous, rather they should be able to speak of the needs of the
community.
These
texts do more than set a ‘high bar,’ they define the qualities needed to be an
appropriate leader of prayers beyond any human reach. The insistence that a
leader of prayer should be ‘free from sin’ is already enough to rule out the
entire human race!
There
is perhaps instruction to be gained in seeing the way in which the Talmudic
requirement that a prayer leader be, ‘one who is burdened [with a large family]
and has no [means to support them].’ It is a powerful image; it speaks to the
urgency and vital importance of congregational prayer. Leading a community is not
about singing and it is not about sounding tuneful. It is about placing
ourselves before God, taking our successes and failures, strengths and
weaknesses and beseeching the Divine for mercy on behalf of the community. But
despite the clear wisdom and beauty in the requirement, it’s gone by the time
of Shulchan Arukh. Indeed the whole demand for perfection, clear in the Talmud
and in the opening definition of what makes an appropriate leader of prayer in
the Shulchan Arukh, is softened greatly by the very next comment.
And if you can’t find one who has all these
qualities, choose the best of the community in matters of wisdom and good deeds.
(OH 53:5)
The
shaliach tzibbur must be desired by their community. And if, teaches the
Shulchan Arukh, you can’t find someone truly appropriate and entirely free of any
failing, then you chose as best as you can.
The
Halachic system, with its myriad of caveats and nuances, is not designed for a
perfect world, full of sinless, error-free humans. It is a very real and very
realistic attempt to challenge us to do the right thing. Of course you cannot
have a perfect leader of prayer. Rather, and this is critical, the key
characteristic of the imperfect leader who ends up serving their community is
that they are chosen by the community. We are the ones who decide whether a
particular candidate to lead us in prayer is appropriate [hagun] or not
good enough.
There
are different ways to respond to this responsibility. One the one hand we can
ratchet up the standards, thinning down the number of prospective candidates,
excluding one for their failure to observe a certain rule of Shabbat
observance, excluding another for their inability to distinguish between a shva
na and a shva nach. Or alternatively we can lower the bar, welcoming
in new prospective leaders of the community; tolerating occasional
mis-pronounciation or personal failing in the hope that the honour of
representing a community will inspire them and us to increase our learning and
refine our behaviour. Different communities, at different times, will approach
this decision in different ways.
So,
how is this decision to be applied at St. Albans Masorti Synagogue today?
Certainly we wish to look up to our prayer leaders. Indeed this is
something that many members stressed in the consultations that preceded the
writing of this paper. But we also see ourselves as an inclusive congregation,
given to sharing honours broadly and encouraging, particularly, those who wish
to improve their skills to do so. We are, as a community, loath to label our
members ‘not good enough’. In the context of this broader approach, the lack of
women prayer leaders felt awkward. Much as we might have wished to hide from
the reality of what we were doing, we were claiming that women were not capable
of being hagun – appropriate. More precisely we made the claim that the
inappropriateness of women is utterly connected to their gender. In other
words, while we welcomed any male, provided they could recite the Hebrew, to
lead the services, we permitted no woman, regardless of her level of knowledge,
piety or commitment.
I
know on a certain level it is possible to make the case that just
because a particular community won’t allow women to lead prayers doesn’t necessarily
mean that that community thinks any less of its women. I know it is
possible to think that women are perfectly good enough in all sorts of ways,
other than leading services, and not to mean to demean 50% of the Jewish
people. I know it is possible to feel that the unique nature of woman
should keep her from leading a community in prayer before God, but not stop her
in other enormously important ways from serving the Holy Blessed One. I know these
things to be possible, but I don’t accept them, either for myself, or the St.
Albans Masorti community.
Accordingly
I conclude, on the question of the appropriateness of a person to serve as
prayer leader, that consideration of a person’s gender should not trump all
other factors. Women, as men are equally able to be considered hagun –
appropriate – by the community.
AN ADDENDUM
Thoughts on the Androcentric Nature of Rabbinics and Rabbinic
Language
The
approach of Rabbis of antiquity towards women is complex. This passage from the
early twentieth century Rabbi J. H. Hertz is a very good example of a traditional
Rabbinic voice;
The Jewish sages recognized the wonderful
spiritual influence [of the Jewish wife], and nothing could surpass the
delicacy with which respect for her is inculcated. [As the Talmud states] ‘Love
your wife as yourself and honour her more than yourself. Be careful not to
cause a woman to weep, for God counts her tears. Israel
was redeemed from Egypt
(J.H Hertz, Pentateuch)
To
a contemporary feminist there is something troubling about the very language
used here, but, nonetheless, the intent is clear. Women are highly valued. More
practically the Rabbis created many brave and creative legal structures to
protect and strengthen the lot of women in ancient times; principally the
institution of the ketubah to protect women with no means of economic
self-sufficiently from being discarded by their husbands.[28]
There
are also occasional glimpses, in the Rabbinic canon, of what might be
considered a gendered awareness of the relationship between men and women. In a
discussion of what happens to inheritances a woman comes into once married
there is a consensus that these devolve to her husband, but there is a
disagreement about what happens to inheritances that an engaged woman comes
into.
Bet Shammai says she can sell it and Bet
Hillel says she can’t…
Rabbi Yehuda said, the Rabbis said before
Rabban Gamliel, ‘Since [the husband] has acquired the woman, shouldn’t he also
acquire the property?’
[Rabban Gamliel] said to them, ‘we are
embarrassed [that a married woman who comes into an inheritance has no control
of it][29], and
you [want us stretch such an embarrassment further]?!’[30]
(Mishnah Ketubot 8:1)
But
even in a relatively aware text such as this the woman is not considered as an
agent in her own right, deciding her own destiny, she is reliant on the man.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the opening words in the Rabbinic treatment of
marriage.
A women is acquired [niknet] in three
ways…
Through money, a writ and sexual intercourse.
(Mishnah Kiddushin 1:1)
The
woman is passive. She is acquired, she is married; she does not acquire, she
does not marry. The woman, in this and many other texts, is objectified. She is
not the subject of her own marriage, just as women were not, in ancient times,
generally considered to be the subject of their own lives.
While
I would have been delighted to have seen a more ‘enlightened’ approach to these
issues in texts over 1500 years old, I am not distressed to find a somewhat old-fashioned
and male-focussed or androcentric approach in texts written in an androcentric
time and place, it would be unreasonable to expect anything else. More worrying
however are moments of misogyny clearly visible in ancient texts. The Rabbis
lived in a homo-social world. In general they had no interaction with women,
either socially or in their study. On occasion, it must be admitted, this lack
of female socialisation is apparent to the point of creating offence.
A woman is as a pitcher full of
excrement and her mouth is full of blood.
(Shabbat 152a)
There
is much to say about this statement. One can offer apologetics and explain context
but texts like this (and there are others) should not be saved. They should not
be considered to reflect God’s wish for humanity; the touchstone of all we
consider holy. Tragically one can detect an impact, on contemporary and traditional
forms of observance, of these moments of misogyny. Women tend not to be treated
as pitcher of excrement, but, as a Rabbi, I meet many women who complain they
have been made to feel second-class Jews. It is surely impossible for anyone
involved in traditional Jewish communities not to be struck by the words of
Cynthia Ozick, author and critic.
In the world at large I call
myself and am called a Jew. But when, on the Sabbath I sit among women in my
traditional shul and the rabbi speaks the word ‘Jew’ I can be sure that he is
not referring to me. For him, ‘Jew’ means ‘male Jew’. When the rabbi speaks of
women, he uses the expression ‘Jewish daughter’ he means it tenderly.
‘Jew’ speaks for itself. ‘Jewish
daughter’ does not. A Jewish daughter is someone whose identity is linked to
and defined by another’s role. ‘Jew’ signifies adult responsibility. ‘Daughter’
signifies immaturity and a dependent and subordinate connection.
When my rabbi says ‘A Jew is
called to the Torah’ he never means me or any other living Jewish woman.
My own synagogue is the only place
in the world where I, a middle aged adult, am defined exclusively by my being
the female child of my parents.
My own synagogue is the only place
in the world where I am not named Jew.
(Cynthia Ozick, On Being A Jewish
Feminist)
Even
when pre-modern Rabbis are striving to do well by women, there is something,
quite literally, patronising in the way men put themselves forward as patrons –guardians
and protectors – while simultaneously rejecting the notion that women could or
should speak for themselves. We have, as Jews, existed for millennia with only
half our voices being heard and recorded and we, now, need to open up our
tradition to the unique contributions, challenges and inspiration that will
come by welcoming women to make their contributions to Jewish life not only from
the home, but also from before the ark, in public, in Synagogue.
This
will not be an easy journey for many. Some men, and some women also, will find
these new voices, contributions and challenges to be uncomfortable. But comfort
is not the test of our religious quest to walk in God’s ways. Rather we must
always strive to do better, to recognise, ever more deeply, the divine image
encoded in all humanity. It is in this context that I decide as follows.
CONCLUSION
- There is nothing
about women that distracts or otherwise makes it impossible for them to
‘conduct’ prayers for a mixed, male and female, community.
- There are no
obligations a male leader of prayer can fulfil on behalf of the community
that a woman cannot.
- Women, at St.
Albans Masorti Synagogue, should be counted in the ‘ten’ that make up a minyan
and the gender of a person should not trump all other considerations when
considering who should lead the community in prayer.
Rabbi
Jeremy Gordon
Kislev
5767
[1] There is a
vast amount of modern material, articles and responsa, on this subject. I have
not referred to every useful source at every moment. That said, as will be
clear, I owe a deep debt to Rabbi David Golinkin whose work in this field is
considerable. See in particular, Responsa B’Inyan HaMehitzah, http://responsafortoday.com/vol2/1.pdf and B’Inyan Nashim B’Minyan, http://www.responsafortoday.com/vol6/1_4.pdf.
These materials are in Hebrew and those only able to access English are
directed to http://www.schechter.edu/women/learnteach.htm
where much of the material is translated, re-worked and made available to a
non-specialist. For detailed bibliographies, including citations of key
material produced by Orthodox legal authorities, see the end of these responsa.
Rabbi David Fine has also discussed, extensively, the history of Masorti
jurisprudence on this issue in his responsum Women And The Minyan http://rabbinicalassembly.org/teshuvot/docs/19912000/oh_55_1_2002.pdf.
[2] See also
Ravad cited in Chidushei haRashba Brachot 25a, Yosef Caro, Bet Yosef OH 75
which take similar positions.
[3] See Succah
52a where Abbaye follows a man and woman as they walk across the meadows
together. As they part, having kept far from transgression, Abbaye acknowledges
he could not have withstood this temptation. Then ‘a wise man tells him “the
more a person becomes greater than their fellow, the more their evil
inclination becomes greater than him.”’
[4] Cherney, B.
Kol Isha, JHCS 10, 57-75 at page 63.
[5] See also
Bet Yosef OH 75. Also restricting the prohibition to singing are Rabad, cited
in Hidushei HaRashba Berachot 25a,
[6] See for
example J. Blau, Responsa of Moses ben Maimon, Machzikei Nirdamim (Jerusalem
[7] This and
other bold emphases in translations of Rabbinic texts are my own.
[8] Mishneh
Torah Hil. Keriat Shema 3.16
[9] See also
Levush, Manhigim, at the end of Orach Hayim, 36, citing Sefer Hasidim, which
takes a similar position.
[10] Emending
the Bar-Ilan Responsa manuscript, which has ‘nashim,’ to ‘anashim,’
thereby preventing tautology.
[11] Loc cit.
See also Sridei Aish 2:8 where boys and girls are encouraged to go to Jewish
youth groups where boys and girls sing together.
[12] See also
Sotah 22a for a story of a woman who went daily to the synagogue of Rebbi
Yochanan.
[13] Golinkin Nashim
Bminyan pp 6-7
[14] Sefer
Hasidim Section 465.
[15] This
section, in particular, follows David Golinkin’s Nashim BMinyan Ucshlichot
Tzibur closely http://www.responsafortoday.com/vol6/1_4.pdf
[16] Loc. cit.
p. 5
[17] To OH
106:1
[18] Loc. cit.
p. 10-11
[19] I return
to look at the issue of pores et shema shortly.
[20] For Rashi
this is a technical term for something not usually seen in contemporary prayer
services. ‘If a number of people come to the Synagogue after the community have
read the Shema, one of them stands up and says the kaddish, barachu
and first blessing before the recitation of the Shema [thereby allowing
latecomers to hear these parts of the service they might otherwise have
missed.]’ ad loc. Rambam considers pores et shema to be ‘One
makes the blessings of the Shema and everyone who hears them answers amen.’ (MT
Hil Tefilah 8:5)
[21] See Rashi,
shaliach tzibur – leader of the community
[22] Though in
Mishnah Sanhedrin 1.6 the same figure is derived from a straight application of
the word congregation in Nunbers 14. See also Gen 42:5 and Psalm 82:1
for other congregationally minded verses.
[23] As opposed
to a congregation of feckless spies lacking in faith!
[24] Teshuvot
Nashim B’Minyan p. 69.
[25] See also
Tur OH 55.1 which also leaves undefined any required gender for the ‘ten.’
[26] It is
interesting to note the Hebrew term used here - ‘ערב.’ This is the same word used as a proof
that a woman’s voice is ערוה (Song of Songs 2:14 and Brachot 24a, see discussion above). The
man should be ערב, the woman is, in traditional circles, banned from leading
since she is ערב/ערוה.
[27] This is
based on Talmud Megillah 24b, see my responsa on Aliyot for Women at http://e-sams.org/standards_of_practice.htm.
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