Tuesday, 6 July 2021

The Principle That Wasn’t - A Re-evaluation of the Matrilineal Principle in Biblical and Rabbinic Judaism

 

 

This is something I wrote a LONG time ago. It's long! Anyone interested in skipping the Biblical material can look for 'Mishnah' and pick up there. 

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In the terms of the Judaism I was taught in Sunday School, the matrilineal principle claims that Jews trace their Jewish status through the maternal line. A born-Jew is a Jew because their mother is Jewish. The practical implication of the principle is that a person with a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother is born a non-Jew, while a person with a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father is a full Jew.[1] In this paper I wish to investigate the origins of this principle. It is a matter that has received the attention of no less a scholar than Shaye Cohen,[2] but for reasons I will detail, I am forced to very different conclusions than Professor Cohen.

 

I will cast doubt on the existence of the principle, certainly in the terms of the Sunday School teaching of my youth. I will also attempt to place the principle of lineality that does exist in a religious and theological context.

 

In a time of such rampant intermarriage and inter-denominational schism an understanding of the historical and theological underpinning of this halachic notion seems deeply necessary. All the more so if we accept Schiffman’s elegant articulation of importance of the issue, ‘[the question of “Who is a Jew”] is not simply a matter of communal strategy or policy. It is not only a question of Jewish survival. It constitutes a profound theological problem. The Jewish people represents [sic] the divine presence on earth.’[3]

 

The existence of a matrilineal principle in Judaism seems somehow out of place. There were and continue to be societies that traced lineage through the mother, specifically in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia but, as Cohen suggests ‘it seems clear that the kinship patterns which characterize [those] matrilineal societies are thoroughly foreign to rabbinic society.’[4] In a general anthropological survey of those societies that do trace lineality through the mother, Schneider and Gough note that ‘essential to matrilineal [societies] was the set of religious beliefs which centered, naturally enough, on an Earth Goddess.’[5] The link between Mother Goddess and matrilineality is one backed up by their research and it makes intuitive sense, but the Mother Goddess is not a mainstream part of Jewish theology. Where else might matrilineality come from? Moreover why would the Rabbinic legal system, a system that has tended to down-play the ability of women to act in ways that have legal effect, choose to honour women with being the bearers of such a critically important legal responsibility as determination of one’s membership of the Jewish people? The oddness of the principle only increases when one starts to try and locate its origin.

 

Biblical Lineality

The plain meaning of the Genesis narrative is overwhelmingly patrilineal – that is the child of a Hebrew father and non-Hebrew mother is considered a Hebrew. For one thing if Abraham was the first Hebrew and there is no record of Sarai/Sara converting then without patrilineality the story of our people would have been very short. Isaac’s wife, Rebecca, daughter of Bethu-el seems to be descended from pagan ancestry on both the side of Nahor and his wife, (Gen 24:15) and yet there is no questioning the status of her children as Hebrews. We do not know the genealogy of the mothers of Jacob’s wives, the Bible only deeming it necessary to tell us of their father (Gen 29:10); again suggesting the patrilineal principle is dominant. Joseph’s wife Asenat (Gen 41:45) is clearly an Egyptian (Gen 41:45) but his children, Ephraim and Menashe are seen as Israelites. The pattern of the avot is replicated in the rest of the Biblical narrative. Moshe marries Zipporah, daughter of the Priest of Midian (Ex 2:16, 21), Samson asks for Philistine girl for a wife (Judg 14:2), Solomon marries foreign women (I Kings 11:1-16) and so on, but nowhere is there a suggestion that the children of these couplings are not considered Israelite. Indeed Rehoboam’s mother was an Amonite women (I Kings 14:21) yet he ascends the throne of Israel, as does Ahaziah son of Jezebel, another non-Israelite. (I Kings 22:40). Of course rabbinic exegesis is unable to accept such heretical notions and this leads to creative attempts to ‘demonstrate’ that these wives did in fact convert.[6] But these efforts should be seen more as drash than an accurate reflection of the straightforward meaning of the text.

 

The Bible does however seem to contain whispers of the possibility of matrilineal kinship in the specific case of ‘matrilocal marriage’; couplings where the non-Israelite man went to live with the Israelite woman. Attai the child of the daughter of Sheshan (a female Israelite) and Jarha (a non-Israelite slave) who resided in the house of Sheshan (I Chron 2:34-35) is seen as an Israelite. The son of Shlomit bat Dibri (a Hebrew) and an Egyptian man, appears to be an Israelite (Lev 24:10) and depending on whether one understands Amasa’s father to be an Israelite as reported in 2 Sam 17:25 or an Ishmaelite as reported in I Chron 21:17 (and the Septuagint on 2 Sam) he too is seen as an Israelite because of the lineage of his mother, Abigail. Whether these isolated incidents represent the first shoots of what is eventually to become a principle is less clear. I suspect these individual cases, rather than suggesting norms of proto-halachic behavior, are no more than individual cases. Cohen sates ‘the Biblical narrative saw marriage as effectively a private matter into which the State had no place intruding,’[7] and the same seems true concerning the status of the children of these marriages. Biblical narratives seem to represent no more and no less than recognition of ethnic/religious status deriving from de facto circumstance.

 

·                A number of verses are cited by the Talmud (B. Kiddushin 68b) in an attempt to show that the matrilineal principle has Biblical origin, but from a historical perspective none is entirely convincing. Exodus 21:4 states that the offspring of a non-Israelite bondwomen given to an Israelite slave belongs to the master which would seem to suggest that the offspring are not considered free Jews as might be the case if their lineality were to follow their father. But, as the Talmud itself recognizes, this is proof only of the position regarding couplings of slaves. Deuteronomy 7:3 is also cited, but this verse applies only to the seven nations and in any event is not proof that the offspring of a coupling of Israelite male and Canaanite female is not considered an Israelite, only that such coupling should not take place. The Rabbis attempt to suggest that such proof is offered in the very next verse, but the way they do so is difficult to understand and should be seen more as an asmachta than a historical reality.[8] As S. Cohen states, the effort of late sources to pin laws restraining intermarriage on the Torah ‘may be good halaka and good preventative medicine, but it is bad history and bad exegesis.’[9]

 

Lineality in the Second Commonwealth

There are however two Biblical narratives that some scholars have suggested do offer a Second Commonwealth historical origin for a full-blown matrilineal principle. In the fifth century BCE, Ezra bewails that so many of the ‘people of Israel, the priests and Levites have not separated themselves off from the peoples of land…They have taken daughters as wives for themselves and for their sons so that the holy seed had become intermingled with the peoples of the land.’ (Ez 9:1-2).[10] Overhearing this Shecaniah, son of Jehiel suggests a response, ‘there is still hope for Israel, let us make a covenant with our God to expel all these women and those who have been born to them in accordance to the bidding of the Lord…Take action, for the responsibility is yours [Ezra] and we are with you.’(Ez 10:2-4). Ezra accepts the advice, and at a meeting of all the men of Judah and Benjamin demands that the men ‘separate themselves from the peoples of the land and from the foreign women. The entire congregation responded in a loud voice, “we must surely do just as you [Ezra] say.’ (Ez 10:11-12). There then follows a list of those Israelite males who had married non-Israelites and had children by these wives and the book closes without confirming that these women or children are in fact expelled. Through time many scholars have used this incident as an example of the historical origin of the application of the matrilineal principle. The oldest recorded claim of this nature is probably R. Haggai’s response to Jacob of Kefar Neburya.[11] A more recent supporter is L. Schiffman who, citing the Ezra incident states, ‘[It is] most likely … that already at this time there was a definite distinction between males and females regarding intermarriage. Whereas all intermarriages were prohibited, the offspring of Jewish mothers were considered Jewish.  The offspring of non-Jewish mothers were not.’ [12]

 

·                While the Ezra incident clearly stresses the Biblical perception of the evils of intermarriage there is no suggestion on the face of the text that a matrilineal principle is being applied. The question of why Ezra only sought the expulsion of the women and their children (as opposed to non-Israelite men and their children) does require explanation, but there is no need to read these verses as giving evidence of the Biblical origin of the matrilineal principle. As Cohen suggests it might be that the children of non-Israelite fathers and Israelite mothers were so obviously not to be considered part of the Israelite nation that there was no need to expel them. Alternatively the reason Ezra spoke only to the Israelite men is that these were the only people over whom he had jurisdiction. I will return to discuss the problem of intermarriage later, but it is important to stress that this text is not strong proof of the Biblical historical origin of an application of a principle (exegetical origins are of course something quite different).

·                 

·                Ezra’s attempt at expulsion has no exact parallel in Nehemiah (C5 BCE), but the final verses of this book contain another tantalizing fragment that may or may not be important to our tale. ‘“How, then can we acquiesce in your doing this great wrong, breaking faith with our God by marrying foreign women?” One of the sons of Joiada, son of the high priest Elishab was a son-in-law of Sanballat the Horonite; I drove him away from me … Oh my God, remember it to my credit’ (Neh 13:27-28 & 31). For Zeitlin this is the historical origin of the matrilineal principle and its appearance may be explained as motivated ‘by political and religious reasons.’[13] During the time of Nehemiah the Samaritans wished to build a Temple on Mount Grazin. This plan was spearheaded by Sanballat the Horonite (a non-Israelite) who thereby became the enemy of Nehemiah who was loyal to Jerusalem. Sanballat, knowing he that needed officiants of Priestly descent to serve in the Temple, gave his daughter in marriage to the grandson of the High Priest Eliashib with a view to her giving birth to Priests who would serve on Mouth Grazin. Zeitlin suggests that the matrilineal principle was invented as a response to this threat. By deeming the children of this daughter not even Jewish they would be unable to serve in the Mount Grazin Temple. While Zeitlin does cite another example of a law enacted in order to destroy any rivalry to the Temple in Jerusalem his argument seems tenuous at best and is uncorroborated by any Rabbinic text. As suggested above one needs to be careful to distinguish both between a one-off incident and the dawning of a new principle and between the principled objection to inter-racial coupling and the development of a matrilineal principle.[14]

·                 

·                Apocryphal texts also operate in similar fashion to texts from the Bible. Examples of the insistence of keeping the ‘seed’ pure are common, unambiguous applications of any supposed matrilineal principle are absent. The Book of Jubilees for example does not suggest the Hebrew/Cananite couplings of Shimon and Judah result in children that are not Hebrews. (34:20). In fact while Jubilees does note that ‘Simeon repented and took a second [possibly Hebrew] wife from Mesopotamia’ (34:21)[15] there is no mention of Judah marrying anyone other than ‘Betasuel, a Canaanite,’ a coupling which in would, if the matrilineal principle were in effect, render all the decedents of the tribe of Judah paradoxically not-Jewish! There is similar agnosticism in Testament of Judah and the Temple Scroll.

·                 

·                The Jewish historians of the time of the Destruction of the Temple also seem to have no knowledge of the principle. Philo calls the children of both Israelite father and non-Israelite mother and Israelite mother and non-Israelite father bastards. Josephus is also un-aware of the principle.[16]

·                 

·                One other pre/non-Rabbinic pair of texts warrants comment. Matthew 1:1-17 (dated between 70-115 CE)[17]and Luke 3:23-37 (circa 80 CE)[18] were both written by self-defined Jews who wished to make a claim for the noble lineage of Jesus. Despite their shared belief that Joseph was not the father of Jesus both trace Jesus’ lineage through Joseph, Jesus’ ‘non-father.’ These Gospels’ desire to lay claim to a worthy patrilineal heritage for Jesus is so great that they are prepared to ignore paternity. This is even more remarkable if one acknowledges that the claim for Jesus’ patrilineality meditated through Joseph seems to tempt questioning of the immaculate fathering of Jesus.[19] It seems that these authors place such a great importance on tracing the lineage through the father that they are prepared to overlook the theological danger of this approach. It seems that up to and including immediate post Second Temple Palestine, to have a line of inheritance meant to have a line of inheritance through the male line. The idea that holiness could be passed through the maternal line seems unusual, and inferior.

·                 

·                Mishna Kiddushin 3:12[20]

·                Until the time of the Mishna we have seen nothing to suggest that there is a matrilineal principle. Indeed all evidence points instead to a strong patrilineal principle. This is acknowledged by Cohen and others. Cohen then suggests a shift of principle in the time of the tannaim, a move away from one position in order to adopt its opposite. There was, he states, ‘a transition from biblical patriliny to mishnaic matriliny.’[21] This seems to me incorrect. Indeed the central text Cohen cites to prove the primacy of ‘mishnaic matriliny,’ Mishna Kiddushin 3:12, seems to do nothing of the sort. Certainly the Mishna does contain hiddushim, new ways of settling grey areas in the law, but, rather than signaling a move away from patriliny it continues the Biblical trend of laying emphasis on the male. I have divided the Mishna into four sections and will comment on each in turn. I cite the Mishna in its entirety here for convenience.

·                 

·                Mishna Kiddushin 3:12

·                Section Aכָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ קִדּוּשִׁין וְאֵין עֲבֵרָה, הַוָּלָד הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַזָּכָר. וְאֵיזֶה, זוֹ כֹהֶנֶת, לְוִיָּה וְיִשְׂרְאֵלִית שֶׁנִּשְּׂאוּ לְכֹהֵן וּלְלֵוִי וּלְיִשְׂרָאֵל.  

Section B

וְכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ קִדּוּשִׁין וְיֵשׁ עֲבֵרָה, הַוָּלָד הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַפָּגוּם. וְאֵיזוֹ, זוֹ אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמַמְזֵר וּלְנָתִין.  

Section C

וְכָל מִי שֶׁאֵין לָהּ עָלָיו קִדּוּשִׁין אֲבָל יֶשׁ לָהּ עַל אֲחֵרִים קִדּוּשִׁין, הַוָּלָד מַמְזֵר. וְאֵיזֶה, זֶה הַבָּא עַל אַחַת מִכָּל הָעֲרָיוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה. 

Section Dוְכָל מִי שֶׁאֵין לָהּ לֹא עָלָיו וְלֹא עַל אֲחֵרִים קִדּוּשִׁין, הַוָּלָד כְּמוֹתָהּ. וְאֵיזֶה, זֶה וְלַד שִׁפְחָה וְנָכְרִית

·                Section A

·  Whenever there is kiddushin and there is no sin [in the coupling of father and mother], the child follows [the status] of the male [the father].[22]

·  And who is this? This is a female Cohen, Levite or Israelite to a male Cohen, Levite of Israelite.

·                Contrary to Cohen’s claim, then, a ‘fully kasher[23] Jew is not Jewish following the Jewish status of their mother, but rather their father. The default position and the prejudiced position of Rabbinic Judaism is patrilineal descent. It seems necessary to begin any consideration of this area of law with this acknowledgement. I have been surprised to find that only one of the modern studies of this question have done so in anything approximating to the clear and direct language of the Mishna itself.[24] P. Hiat and B. Zlotowitz, in an article whose very raison d’etre is the collecting of sources of patrilineality, interpret this section of our Mishna as concerned only with ‘preserving the purity of the kehuna’ and applying only to the ‘social status,’[25] by which they mean the child’s status as one of either a Cohen, Levi or Israelite. But there seems to be no reason to limit the straightforward meaning of the reisha to this subsidiary matter of intra-religious or social status. The continuation of the Mishna clearly suggests that the technical term, ‘lkuv skuv’ applies to all matters of status, both intra and inter-religious and there is no form of words used in Section A itself to suggest the narrow reading offered by Hiat and Zlotwitz.

 

Once one acknowledges the default position of Rabbinic Judaism to be patrilineal (and not matrilineal) several observations become possible.

Firstly Rabbinic Judaism now seems a good deal closer to the Bible than one might have thought. The Bible is basically a patrilineal narrative and this is the default position taken by the Rabbis.

Secondly Biblical/Rabbinic Judaism is no longer such an odd fit amongst other ancient religions/nations, seeming to advance primacy for women in one central area where elsewhere tending to a range of responses towards women that are less honorific.

Thirdly the search for historical precedent for matrilineality in the Bible becomes far less important than one might have presumed were matrilineality to be the default position as opposed to a fallback position. Had Schiffman or Zeitlin not felt such a burning need to root the matrilineal principle in Biblical text, perhaps they would not have forced their readings of Ezra and Nehemiah. Of course the search of the Rabbis for a halachic asmachta, a hook on which to hang their new articulation of a back-up position, remains valid, but this is, as I have suggested above, not a matter for the historian.

 

 Having acknowledged this default – patrilineal – principle we may now turn to fallback positions. How will rabbinic Judaism treat ‘grey areas’ where the default position of sinless and effective kiddushin does not apply? We may assume that if a child is born of a non-Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father it will be non-Jewish, but what if only one of the parents is Jewish? Before the Mishna turns to this question it considers two other issues of ‘gray area’ status. What if there was a sin committed in the kiddushin of the parents, what if kiddushin could not take place between these particular Jewish parents?

 

Section B

When there is kiddushin and sin, the child follows [the status] of the defective.

And who is this? This is the case when a widow is married to a High Priest or a divorced woman or a haluzah to an ordinary priest or a mamzeret or a netinah to an Israelite, and the daughter of an Israelite to a mamzer or a natin.

 

This is, as the Rambam notes, problematic; while the offspring of a mamzer and an Israelite does indeed take the status of the defective parent (i.e. becomes a mamzer regardless of the gender of the mamzer parent). The offspring of a priest’s sinful kiddushin does not follow either the status of the father or the mother, rather it becomes something new – a halal [lit. a profaned one], one excluded from the Priesthood. Since the meaning of the Mishna does not correspond to the language it uses (and since the word hapigum is attested in all the manuscripts[26]) it seems that the term and the structure of the Mishna seek to convey something beyond a mere legal modality. I suggest the baal hamishna wishes to convey a very measured response to the disgust he feels towards actions that, literally, profane the Priesthood. “If you,” the Mishna addresses the male Priest, “do something flawed/profane and that action results in offspring, then that child shall be labeled flawed/profane.” One can see in this measured response either politics or religion. Politically this acts as a deterrent. Religiously there is something like a midah caneged midah punishment of the child for the sin of the parent. It is as if there has been some violation of a cosmic order prescribing only certain potential mates for Priests and Israelites. Violation of this cosmic order brings as a quid pro quo the measured response of the child’s exclusion from that part of the cosmic order the father was born into. I believe that once one starts to see either deterrent or this midah caneged midah at work at this point in the Mishna, one begins to develop a different understanding of the matrilineal principle than is offered in previous works.

 

If this reading is correct then this is the Section of the Mishna that is concerned with ‘preserving the purity of the kehuna’ and the ‘social status’[27] of the offspring. This strengthens the contention made above - Section A is not to be understood to apply only to matters of ‘social status’ rather it must be seen as setting the default position for both inter and intra-religious status.

 

Section C

We see this deterrent or midah caneged midah pattern repeated in the Section C of the Mishna.

 

And anyone who couples with someone but couldn't have kiddushin with that person, but could have kiddushin with others, the child is a mamzer.  

And who is this? This is one who couples with one of those prohibited under the laws of exogamy in the Torah.[28]

 

·                We should note that the mamzer is in law a Jew, obligated to fulfill all the mitzvot, however the mamzer is excluded from marrying (kiddushin lo tosfin) Priests, Levites or Israelites (mamzerim can marry one other). Thus the measured response may be expressed like this, “if you could have had kiddushin but instead coupled with another Jew in a way that precluded kiddushin, your offspring shall be a Jew precluded from kiddushin.’ Again this can be seen cosmically as midah caneged midah or as a deterrent as suggested above.

 

This Section of the Mishna can be understood to articulate a ‘Goldilocks Principle;’ seeking to strike a balance between coupling with those too close[29] (unacceptable) and coupling with those too far away (also unacceptable), and seeks a choice of mate that is, in the words of our fairytale-heroine, ‘just right’.

 

Section D

Finally we get to our third fallback position, the case of only one Jewish parent.

 

And [anyone who couples with a woman] who could not have had, either with him or any other man kiddushin, the child is like her.

And who is this? This is the child of a female slave or a female non-Jew.

 

The first thing to note is that this Section of the Mishna is not a full articulation of the matrilineal position; it gives us only the law for a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother. For an articulation of how to approach the child of a Jewish mother and non-Jewish father one needs to turn to Masechet Yevamot. Such a fragmented approach seems messy, especially if this Mishna really marks the ‘transition from biblical patriliny to mishnaic matriliny’ as Cohen suggests. If however this Mishna heralds no such grand shift then this half-hearted articulation becomes less of a concern.

 

There is something else to be understood from the way this Section addresses itself solely to the non-Jewish mother. This section is about excluding a possible Jew from the community, not about counting as a member one with a Jewish mother and non-Jewish father. Putting aside, for the moment, Yevamot the whole issue of status becomes a case of an ‘excluded middle,’ one of the classic responses of the Rabbis to gray areas of law. There is nothing dramatic about the Mishna examining a mixture of permitted and prohibited and finding the result prohibited. As Neusner claims, ‘gray areas in general, and the excluded middle in particular, cover the surface of the law. They fill up nearly every chapter of the Mishna,’[30] and he brings dozens of examples from the six orders of the Mishna to prove his case.

 

I suggest that we need not look to this Section for any grand articulation of marked shift in principle. Rather it is simply a continuation of the measured deterrent or midah caneged midah response to defective couplings we have seen in Sections B – D. Just as the Bible is primarily concerned with the case of Israelite males coupling with non-Israelite females, so too the Mishna expresses its reprobation of this action in the context of deterring Israelite men from coupling with non-Jewish women. This Section can be expressed as, “if you think you can multiply your seed by coupling outside the Israelite community, that seed shall be deemed outside the community.”

 

Now we can understand this half of the matrilineal principle in context. Far from being to the honour of the woman this section is about the disgrace of the father. As a matter of principle it seems all but entirely uninterested in the mother. If the purpose of procreation, as construed by the patrilineal Mishna and the religious and social system in which the Rabbis were operating, is to create offspring to continue the line of the father, the Rabbis respond to the pigima of coupling with a non-Jew by having the child follow the pigma, just as is the case in Section B. It is correct to note that the status of the child of a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother will be matrilineal, but this is surely accidental to the main purpose of the Mishna. The entire focus of Sections B, C and D is deterrent and/or midah caneged midah punishment of the child for the sins of the parent. In Section B & D the punishment for a non-sanctioned coupling is that the child holech achar ha pigum – follows the status of the defective, which in the case of the Jewish father and non-Jewish mother happens to mean the child is deemed matrilineal, but this is a practical outcome, not a principled stance.

 

Looking at the Mishna as a whole an underlying theological concern becomes clear. The Mishna may be expressed in terms of covenantal membership and ability to act in a covenantal manner.

The High Priest is the most restricted category, followed by a normal Priest, a breach of their covenantal responsibility results in offspring that are precluded from the brit shalom/brit melach, the covenant of the Priesthood.

Next is a more serious breach, if an Israelite couples with a mamzer, the child will be a mamzer, [31] a member of the covenant, but precluded from marital relations with other Israelites – precluded from sustaining the covenant of the people of Israel.

Finally the most serious breach, if an Israelite couples with a non-Jew or slave their offspring are non-Jews – they are precluded from the covenant of in all respects.[32]

 

In seeing this pattern clearly the modern reader needs to transcend a modern deep discomfort with the mamzer when compared to a mere mild discomfort (if at all) felt towards the non-Jew. For the Rabbis of the Mishna the reverse is the case. Non-Jews were of a lower status than mamzerim.[33]

 

A Dead End

If Section D is to be read as a threat of a measured response where the prospect of matrilineality is not a grand new articulation, but rather an ancillary detail, one of the commonly suggested reasons for Judaism’s adoption of matrilineality fall by the wayside. This is that Judaism adopted matrilineality due to the uncertainty of paternity when contrasted to the certainty of matrilineality.

 

As Zeitlin has shown,[34] Rabbinic Judaism has remarkably little struggle with the ‘uncertainty of paternity.’ Rabban Gamliel and R. Eliezer are prepared to accept an unmarried woman’s testimony as to the father of her child (Mishna Ketubot 1:9) and even in the case of a woman who conceives in a rape the Rabbis do not opt for matrilineal certainty but instead attribute to the child the status of ‘most of the men of the town’ (M. Ket 1:10). But there is no need to even consider this reason. If matrilineality is a fallback position and a punishment, the question of certainty never arises.

 

The Reason for the Exclusion of the Child of a Jewish Father and Non-Jewish Mother

It seems that the theological root of the exclusion of the child of a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother from the covenant is, as has been noted above, a straightforward development of Biblical attitudes towards Israelite males coupling with non-Jewish females. The Biblical disgust with this action is so great that the Rabbis refuse to grant to the child the ‘proper’ lineality of the child of a ‘proper’ coupling. We may therefore see the refusal to acknowledge one with a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother as an attempt to prevent intermarriage.

 

The way that theology drove law in regard to the prevention of intermarriage is articulated with great clarity by S. Cohen, but oddly, only his work on intermarriage. Nowhere in his work on matrilineality does is he as clear as in the earlier work I cite here.

 

‘Moses did not think it necessary to forbid marriage with all foreigners, but later Jews did. During the period of the second Temple, with the loss of national sovereignty and the increased interaction with gentiles, the Jews sense that their survival depended upon their ideological (or “religious”) and social separation from the outside world. Since the Mosaic legislation was inadequate for their needs they erected new barriers between themselves and the gentile, especially during the Maccabean and rabbinic periods. But in order to emphasize the seriousness of these taboos, many Jews argued that they were of Mosaic origin.’[35]

 

This seems true, but the Rabbis did not stop at legislating to forbid inter-marriage (and here I go further than Cohen) they also deprived the offspring of these couplings membership of the covenant.

 

The Jewish Mother and Non-Jewish Father in the Mishna

We must now turn to the other half of the supposed matrilineal principle, the case of a Jewish mother and non-Jewish father. As has been noted this is not attested to in Kiddushin, but rather Yevamot. S. Cohen states, ‘Elsewhere the Mishna does refer to this half of the matrilineal principle. M. Yevamot 7:5 states, without giving any reason that the child of a Jewish mother and a gentile or slave father is a mamzer.[36]  But this is not an articulation of the matrilineal principle. The mother is not a mamzer, and therefore the child of a relationship between a female-Jew and a male non-Jew is not following the status of the mother, even if the father is a slave. And there is no other tannaitic text which states, in the terms my Sunday School teacher, the notion that the status of the child of a non-Jewish father and Jewish mother follows that of the mother.[37] I suspect the root of my discomfort with S. Cohen’s article is that he has assumed the matrilineal principle existed in Mishnaic Judaism, despite all the difficulties that this approach affords him. I suggest it is preferable to assume that the principle does not exist until that time in history when there is sufficient evidence to suggest that it does.

 

While the Mishna in Yevamot does not expound a matrilineal principle, it is evidence of a difference in treatment of children depending on which of their parents were Jewish.

 

Mishna Yevamot 7:5

כֵּיצַד, בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְכֹהֵן, וּבַת כֹּהֵן לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, וְיָלְדָה הֵימֶנּוּ בַת, וְהָלְכָה הַבַּת וְנִשֵּׂאת לְעֶבֶד, אוֹ לְגוֹי, וְיָלְדָה הֵימֶנּוּ בֵן, הֲרֵי זֶה מַמְזֵר.

....[There is a legitimate relationship], and he gives birth to a daughter and the daughter goes and marries (nisat !) a slave or a non-Jew and he gives birth to a son, behold this is a mamzer.

 

The second part of this Mishna is difficult to explain. While it does not contradict M Kiddushin 3:12, it might have echoed its sentiment more clearly if it had considered the child a non-Jew.

 

The sense is that the child of a Jewish father is excluded from the covenant in total, but the child of a Jewish mother is ‘merely’ excluded from the community. I am unsure what, if anything, to read into this disparity. It might be that the tannaim saw the status of mamzer as a general way of expressing disdain for the behaviour of women who marry out, but, possibly owing to a sense of mercy to a Jewish woman who has transgressed in this way if she still wished to remain within the community, and in this case opted not to exclude her child from the covenant (render the child a mamzer). This leniency might be felt possible in the light of the Bible’s relative silence in not condemning female Israelites marrying male non-Israelites in anything approaching the terms used to condemn intermarriage of Jewish males. If this is the case then we may see the theological concern of this Mishna as at least generally in line with the Mishna in Kiddushin – the elimination of intermarriage, even if the practical implication of their principled stance is different.

 

The Jewish Mother and Non-Jewish Father in the Gemorah

The Talmud discusses the issue of the status of the Jewish mother and non-Jewish father, not in the context of Mishna 7:5, but in the fourth chapter, folios 44-45. I will return to this detail later. The first mention of the possibility of the child of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father being kasher is a statement of Rav Yosef (45a) who seems frustrated at the vast list of amoraim who have been cited in support of such a child being seen as a mamzer.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: רְבוּתָא לְמִחְשַׁב גַּבְרֵי?! הָא רַב וּשְׁמוּאֵל בְּבָבֶל, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ בֶּן לֵוִי וּבַר קַפָּרָא בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְאָמְרִי לַהּ חַלּוֹפֵי בַּר קַפָּרָא וְעַיֹּילֵי זִקְנֵי דָרוֹם, דְּאָמְרִי: גּוֹי וְעֶבֶד הַבָּא עַל בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל הַוָּלָד כָּשֵׁר!

Said Rav Yoseph, is it a great thing to enumerate persons? Surely it was Rab and Shmuel in Babylon and R. Yehoshua ben Levi and Bar Kapara in the Land of Israel…who stated that if a non-Jew or a slave had intercourse with an Israelite daughter the child is kasher. No, said Rav Yoseph, it is the opinion of Rebbi. For when Rav Dimi came he stated in the name of our Master (Rebbi) that if a non-Jew had intercourse with an Israelite daughter the child is a mamzer.

 

This is confusing, does Rav Yoseph believe Rab, Shmuel and others believe the child is kosher or does he believe that their belief is incorrect? Is he disagreeing with the reporting of a masorah or with the application of law? In any event one does have a sense that the direction of the sugya is shifting at this point. The next authorities cited, Rav Yehoshua Ben Levi (first generation Amora from Israel),[39] and Rav Natan and Rav Yehuda Ha Nasi state unequivocally that the child of this relationship is kasher, even if forbidden to marry a Priest.[40] Still more authorities (Rav Matena, Rav Yehuda, Raba) are lined up in support of the kashrut of the child of such a relationship and the discussion is concluded with the statement,

And this is the law: A non-Jew or a slave who comes upon a Daughter of Israel, the child is kasher,[41] whether [the mother] is unmarried or married.

 

It is however clear that as late as the third generation of amoraim, both in Bavel and Eretz Yisrael, the matter is in dispute. Rav Dimi (Amora third generation Bavel), Rav Yitzchak bar Avudimi (A 3B), Rav Acha (A 3B?), R. Tanchum (A 3Y), Rav Ami (A 3Y), R. Yochanan (A 2Y), R. Eleazar (A 3Y) and R. Chanina (A 3Y) all consider (as the Mishna suggests) such a child as a mamzer.[42]

 

So here is the source of the matrilineal principle - a child receiving the status of the Jewish mother, not the non-Jewish father. It may be traced to Rebbi (though this masorah is in dispute), but is certainly the opinion of Rav Yehoshua Ben Levi. While controversial until the third generation of amoraim, it is accepted by the stam of the Gemorah as representing law.

 

While accepted, and normative today, this position runs against that of Mishna Yevamot 7:2, which states the child is a mamzer. The inclusory nature of this part of the principle also seems to run counter to the ‘excluded middle’ spirit of Mishna Kiddushin 3:12. I suspect that to understand what if any theology lies behind this radical hiddush one needs to read the discussion in the Talmud in the light of the Mishna in which it is found.

 

As mentioned above this discussion takes place not in its proper place (the Seventh Chapter), but in the Fourth Chapter, in the broader context of a Mishna that extends the application of the status of mamzer to classifications broader than the Bible suggested.

·  Mishna Yevamot 4: 13 (B. 44a)

·  The one who returns to his divorcee or marries his halutza, or marries the relative of his halutza, he must send her out [divorce her] and any child is a mamzer, these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. The hachamin say, the child is not a mamzer. But they agree that where the one marries the relative of his divorcee, the child is a mamzer.

 

Almost immediately the Gemorah reins back this extended application of mamzerut.

·  Rabbi Yosef said Reish Lakish said, ‘all agree that the one who returns to his divorcee the child is not permitted to the Prtiesthood [but is not a mamzer]’ (Yev 44a-b)...

·  One who marries a relative of his halutza, Rabbi Akiva said, there is no kiddushin, she doesn’t need a divorce document from him and she is unfit to marry a priest [pasulah] and her child is unfit to marry a priest [pasul] and we force the man to send her out. The hachamim say, there is kiddushin, she needs a divorce document from him, she is kashera and the child is kasher [the Gemorah asks] ‘fit’ to whom? The Priesthood? No the whole community [i.e. according to both Rabbi Akiva and the hachamim the child is not a mamzer.] (Yev 44b) 

·                A claim that Rabbi Akiva makes that a certain child is a mamzer is re-defined to suggest that the child is ‘merely’ a toevah, and refused from the Priesthood. (Yev 44b).   

·                At the conclusion of this reclassification of those Mishna Yev 4:13 has deemed a mamzer as full members of the community (but in-eligible to marry Priests), we encounter the Mishna from the Seventh Chapter. This Mishna also classified a child as a mamzer in a way the Bible did not prescribe; we may therefore expect to see that our Seventh Chapter Mishna will also be reined back and the expansive classification of mamzer will be overturned and replaced with a classification as a full member of the community (but in-eligible to marry Priests). This is, as stated above, exactly what happens. At the historical point where the debate as to whether the child of a Jewish mother and a non-Jewish father is Jewish or a mamzer, and at the point of the redaction of the Gemorah, the concern is not on ascribing lineality to the mother, but on a desire of ammoraim to limit the tannaim’s expansive development of the status of mamzer.

·                This does not seem too theologically complex. The Bible takes a very strong position against those who, in Goldilock’s terms, couple with those who are too close - they are forbidden to enter the congregation to the tenth generation (Deut 23:3). The baal hamishna also wishes to discourage certain couplings, so labels the child produce of these relationships as mamzerim as if this were a catch-all classification for children born from undesirable couplings.[43] By the time of the amoraim the long term difficulties of classification of a person as a mamzer become too brutal and the classification is scaled back only to those whom the Bible specified. The practical effect of this principled stance is matrilineality, but, as in our analysis of Mishna Kiddushin 3:12, we need to distinguish between principle and practical effect if we wish to understand underlying religious meaning.

·                More Dead Ends

This analysis separates the two parts of the development of the current halacha by some 250 years. Scholars understand Mishna Kiddushin 3:12 to be Yavnean,[44] but the acceptance of the second half of the principle post-dates the third generation of ammoraim. I suspect this means we must reject perhaps S. Cohen’s most novel interpretation of the ideological origin of the principle – that it matches Mishna Kilayim 8:4.[45] Kilayim does offer a model for the status of the offspring of a horse and a donkey following the mother, (not the father and not becoming classified as a new species), but neither Mishna Kiddushin 3:12 nor Yevamot 7:5 offers a similar single articulation of this position in the case of humans.

I also argue that the possible Roman influence on Rabbinics seems a poor explanation when the centrality of matrilineality is downgraded and its development is understood as partial and disparate. Ulpian V:8 states in clear terms that ‘if there be connubium [which may be understood as something close to kiddushin][46] between the parents the children always follows the father. In the absence of connubium they follow the condition of the mother.’[47]

But this articulation, like Mishna Kilayim 8:4, is far cleaner than the articulation of our Mishna which does not simply contain Sections A & D, but sections B & C as well. Nor does it match Mishna Yevamot 7:3. It cannot come as a surprise that the default position of both Roman and Rabbinic systems is the patrilineal principle. This was the case for the vast majority of the Ancient World,[48] but whereas the Ulpian citation seems to establish a matrilineal principle that applies if either the father or the mother (or seemingly neither the father nor the mother) were capable of connubium and contracting justum matrimonium, our texts show matrilineality to be an incidental detail and not a principle. When one adds this insight to the major problems noted by S. Cohen[49] I suspect the evidence for a connection is weakened fatally.

I suggest the different desires that lie beneath the different halves of the de facto position of modern law alleviate the need to find one unifying theological or ideological root for the de facto position of modern law. Moreover retrospective attempts to graft unifying theoretical roots onto this ‘non-principle’ are likely to prove errant.

Conclusion

We have seen that there is no explicit ‘matrilineal principle’ in Biblical or Rabbinic Judaism. Rather Biblical and Rabbinic Judaism (and even proto-Christianity) consider patrilineal inheritance to be the proper way for a Jew to receive their status. From an ideological perspective this seems to confirm the androcentrism of Biblical and Rabbinic societies and texts. The de facto legal position that does exist in law; that the child with one Jewish parent is considered to have the status of its mother may be seen as the product to two different Rabbinic desires.

  • The Rabbinic dislike of inter-marriage and
  • The Rabbinic desire to limit the number of mamzerim in Israel.

Just as the Bible focuses on rejecting Israelite male inter-marriage, so too the Rabbis focus on rejecting the offspring of a coupling where the male intermarries. However as the Bible has less to say on the matter of Israelite female inter-marriage, there is room for the baal hamishna to articulate another option – the mamzer – the child takes neither the status of the mother or father. Realising that the Mishna seems to open up the possibility of multiplication of mamzerim the Rabbis of the Talmud reject this option and instead allow the restricted Jew (mamzer) to enter the community as a full Jew, albeit one prohibited from the marrying into the Priesthood.

As a final point I should say something about the nature of the relationship between the underlying principles and practical effects. It has been suggested to me that since the practical effects of the laws discussed in this paper give rise to matrilineal inheritance, we should consider that matrilineal inheritance is a matter of principle. This must be wrong. Moreover, as a matter of religious insight, the principle must be more important than the practical effects. One brief example drawn from a far less contentious area of Halacha may serve. As a matter of principle meat and milk may not be eaten together. Nothing could be clearer – as a matter of principle. As a matter of practical effect however, there are cases in which a large amount of meat into which a tiny piece of accidentally spilt milk may be eaten. That is to say the principle of eating meat and milk together is different to the practical effect of eating meat and milk together. No-one would claim otherwise. Nor should anyone claim that, as a matter of principle, Jews allow – in any circumstance – the eating of milk and meat together. The principle exists and demands investigation even if the practical effect of the totality of the legal system says something different to what the principle might claim.



[1] In this paper I have used the term Hebrew when referring to those born in the early Genesis narratives, Israelite to refer those born between Exodus and Ezra/Nehemiah narratives and Jew to those born thereafter - no other distinction between Hebrew, Israelite or Jew is implied. Exactly whether these Hebrews, Israelites or Jews are members of a religion, a race or a people is an issue beyond the scope of this paper and I have not attempted absolute consistency in my use of these terms – again no distinction between them is implied. Unless stated otherwise all translations are my own.

[2] S. Cohen, “The Origins of the Matrilineal Principle”, AJS Review 10,1 (1985) 19-53 (hereafter Origins).

[3] L. Schiffman, p. 45 “The Limits of Tolerance” in Conflict or Cooperation, Papers on Jewish Unity, (NY CLAL Publications, 1989) 39-46

[4] Origins, p. 21

[5] D. Schneider Matrilineal Kinship (Berkley, University of California Press, 1961) p vii

[6] V. Aptowitzer’s “Asenath, The Wife of Joseph” Hebrew Union College Annual 1 (1924) 239-306 details the rabbinic grappling with this particular incident in great detail.

[7] Origins p. 21

[8] Rashi understands Deut 7:4, ‘For he will turn your children away from me.’ to describe the case of a non-Israelite father turning the Israelite child of an Israelite mother away from God. For Rashi, only in the case of a non-Israelite father and Israelite mother would the child be considered both as belonging to God and in danger of being turned away from God by the presence of a non-Israelite parent. For Tosafot the coupling is of an Israelite father and a non-Israelite mother. The ‘he’ of the verse refers to the father of the mother who will turn away the Israelite son-in-law. Tosafot’s understanding does sit well with other verses (such Ex 34:16) that suggest the Bible’s chief concern was couplings between Israelite males and non-Israelite females, but does not really explain a Biblical root of the principle of matrilineality.

[9] S. Cohen, “From the Bible to the Talmud: The Prohibition of Intermarriage” Hebrew Annual Review, Vol 7 (1983) 23-39 p. 30, ‘The sins of Israel determine retrospectively the content of Biblical revelation.’ Loc cit p.30

[10] All translations from Ezra and Nehemia - New Jewish Publication Society.

[11] P. Kiddushin 3:14 64d and parallels

[12] L. Schiffman “At the Crossroads: Tannaitic Perspective on the Jewish Christian Schism”, in Jewish and Christian Self-Definition”, Volume 2, Aspects of Judaims in the Graeco-Roman Period, ed. E.P. Sanders et al. (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1981) pp 117-122.

[13] S. Zeitlin, p. 137, The Offspring of Intermarriage, Jewish Quarterly Review, 51 (1960) 135-140, Shiffman loc cit. also cites the Nehemiah passage in support of his claim, mentioned above, that the matrilineal principle was in effect in Biblical times.

[14] This latter distinction is accurately noted in B. Cohen “Some Remarks on the Law of Persons in Jewish and Roman Jurisprudence”, Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 16 (1946-7) 1-37, p. 12

[15] Translation - Charles.

[16] See Philo, On the Life of Moses 2:36 §193 and Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 3.12.2 §276 for one example from each author, see Origins p. 28 for many other references.

[17] Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible III: 312 and sources cited there.

[18] Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible III: 185 and sources cited there.

[19] And indeed there is a manuscript of Matthew (the Old Syriac (Sinaitic)) that states that Joseph was the father of Jesus, see New Interpreter’s Bible, Vol VII p. 130.

[20] I first learnt this Mishna with Dr Steve Wald, Conservative Yeshiva 1999 and a number of ideas articulated in this section of the paper are his.

[21] Origins, p. 52.

[22] per Albeck and classical commentary.

[23] I use this term to apply to the child born out of a coupling where kiddushin applied and no sin was committed.

[24] B. Cohen “Some Remarks on the Law of Persons in Jewish and Roman Jurisprudence”, Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 16 (1946-7) 1-37 p.12 is the honourable exception. Origins,  L. Schiffman, “At the Crossroads: Tannaitic Perspective on the Jewish Christian Schism, in Jewish and Christian Self-Definition”, Volume 2, Aspects of Judaims in the Graeco-Roman Period, ed. E.P. Sanders et al. (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1981) pp 117-122,  S. Zeitlin, p. 137, The Offspring of Intermarriage, Jewish Quarterly Review, 51 (1960) 135-140, L. Epstein, Marriage Laws in the Bible and the Talmud (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1942) esp pp. 174 and 194-197, and even P. Hiat and B. Zlotowitz, “Sources on Patrilineal Descent”, Journal of Reform Judaism (Winter 1983, 43-48) p. 46 fail to acknowledge this.

[25] P. Hiat and B. Zlotowitz, “Sources on Patrilineal Descent”, Journal of Reform Judaism (Winter 1983, 43-48) p. 46.

[26] Though often followed by the term ovhbaca/

[27] Terminology used by P. Hiat and B. Zlotowitz, ad loc, in their discussion of Section A of the Mishna.

[28] This is a loose translation designed to render the accepted meaning of this section accessible.

[29] Thereby possibly breaching the necessity of leaving the father and mother cleaving to another. (Gen 2:24)

[30] See Neusner, Judaism: The Evidence of the Mishna (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981) p. 261

[31] The historical oddity of the netin need not detain us at this point.

[32] Section C does not fit so clearly into this structure, I suggest that the oldest version of this Mishna contained Sections A, B and D in order, Section C (the Goldilocks section) was then included to explain the origin of the mamzer since this category is mentioned in Section B and the possibility of creation of a mamzer not only existed in the time of tannaim, but would come about by virtue of defective coupling.

[33] Evidence for this relationship is suggested in the opinion of the Rabbi Tarfon in the next Mishna, Kiddushin 3:13, an opinion which only makes sense if one agrees the slave (and therefore a non-Jew by analogy) is a lower status than the mamzer and the coupling between the two results in the offspring gaining the status of the lower parent, thereby being born a slave. This hierarchical relationship is clearer in Mishna Horayot 3:8, ‘A priest takes precedence over a Levite, a Levite over an Israelite, an Israelite  over a mamzer, a mamzer over a netin, a netin over a convert …’ Even though a non-Jew can convert and a mamzer can never lose this status, the Rabbis view the convert as ‘lower’ than a mamzer, how much the more so we may assume they felt the mamzer more important than non-Jew.

[34] Zeitlin, op cit, p. 136.

[35] S. Cohen, p. 30 “From The Bible to the Talmud: The Prohibition of Intermarriage”, Hebrew Annual Review, Vol 7 (1983) 23-39, p. 36.

[36] Origins. p. 46. Tosefta Kid 4:16 also records a Tanna Kama position that such a child would be a mamzer.

[37] Rabbi Shimon’s disagreement with the Tanna Kama in the Tosefta cited above, that the child of the marriage would not be a mamzer is not a clear statement that the child is to be considered Jewish, nor can it be seen to be normative in Mishnaic times (see below).

[38] This seems an application of Section D of M. Kid 3:12.

[39] All generation attributions from H. Albeck, Mavo L’Talmudim (Tel Aviv, Dvir, 1969) pp 669-681.

[40] According to the Masorah of Rabin, but not according to the Masorah of Rav Dimi.

[41] Though not permitted to marry a Cohen.

[42] This wealth of disagreement is strong evidence for the claim made in footnote above; namely Rabbi Shimon’s claim that the child is not a mamzer cannot be seen as conclusive evidence that the child was considered Jewish. Rabbi Shimon could have considered the product of this mixed marriage an ‘excluded middle.’

[43] Or more specifically from couplings that would incur karet, see Yev 44a-b

[44] Origins, p.34, J. Epstein Introduction to Tanaitic Literature, ed E. Melamed [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press 1957), J. Neusner A History of the Mishnaic Law of Women (Leiden, Brill, 1980) 5:173 and 200-201.

[45] Origins p. 47

[46] B. Cohen, op cit, p 14.

[47] trans J. Muirhead.

[48] See D. Schneider Matrilineal Kinship (Berkley, University of California Press, 1961)

[49] S. Cohen acknowledges difficulties in charting how Rabbis might have learnt Roman law, and is unable to suggest any reason why Rabbis chose to base their articulations on the hated Roman system

Friday, 18 June 2021

Chukat and Ruyard Kipling

 


 

At the heart of this week’s reading, Moses beats a rock – a rock God instructed him to speak to. For this action, Moses doesn’t make it into the Promised Land. Moses, of course, has a temper. As a child, he beat an Egyptian, burying him before fleeing into the desert. He has called out his followers as failures and, this week labels them ‘Morim’ – rebels. It’s not that he is wrong – the Children of Israel are graceless, rebellious and revolting. But Moses feels under-appreciated and put-upon. In a Midrash (BMidbar Rabba 19:9) the Rabbis imagine that, at first, only drips of water emerge from the rock – miraculous certainly, but prompting from the masses the sneering allegation, “what are we, sucklings or babes just weaned from milk?” And that sneering response is the thing that ignites in Moses his second striking of the rock, the one that brings upon him Divine sentence.

 

These recent Parshiot paint the most remarkable portrait of a leader unravelling under pressure. Every year I’m struck with enormous empathy as Moses receives the sentence for losing his temper. It’s so easy to understand how a person would come to strike out – after doing so much. But it’s not just leaders who face these pressures, and it’s not just leaders who are called upon to resist anger in thought, word and deed despite the provocation. It’s all of us.

 

We are in a wonderful run of BM celebrations – six in two months! – and my mind flits back to a gift my father gave me as a child; a framed print of Ruyard Kipling’s poem, If.

 

If you can meet with triumph and disaster
And treat those two imposters just the same;

Then yours is the world and everything in it. And what is more, you’ll be a man my son.

 

We are called upon to find ways to respond to threat, challenge and the disregard of others with patience. We are called upon to demonstrate equanimity, especially when treating our fellows. Rambam called this the golden path – the Shvil HaZahav. It leads from childhood to adulthood and eventually to the Promised Land. Above all, be kind.

 

Shabbat Shalom

 

 

Monday, 14 June 2021

Korach and Cancel Culture

 


There’s a good word for what happens to Korach, in the portion that Harry read so well earlier.

He gets cancelled.

He says something, and so out-of-order, so unacceptable, that he pays with being removed, never again to intrude.

Except, and this is the so often the thing about the cancel-culture debate – it just feels more complex than that. I mean, what is the thing Korach said? “Rav Lachem - You have taken too much on yourself.” It’s an arguable position, no? Rashi suggests Korach says – “If you were going to appoint your brother as High Priest, you shouldn’t have also appointed yourself as King. You two aren’t the only people who heard God on Sinai?” Well, that’s at least an arguable position.

And yet Moses is so angered that he insists that God creates a new form of cancellation – a means of death by which no human has ever before died.

It all feels very contemporary. There are debates about, oh I don’t know, race or gender or Israel or even whether it’s time to turn the screens off and go to bed and there are arguments to be had and points to be made, and then there comes the moment in the the argument when one party calls on the earth open up to devour one’s opponents. OK, not literally swallowed up by the earth, at least not often.

But arguments tilt in the direction of aggression more often, perhaps than the times in which arguments tilt in the direction of having disputing parties genuinely seek points of agreement and meeting and growth and transformation and all the good stuff.

Sometimes people who raise arguments are genuinely enquiring, and the fact that they disturb our view of what is right is a sign that our securities and assumptions need to be re-evaluated. And sometimes people who raise arguments are a bit prickly and over-step the mark of decency in terms of how they make their points. Sometimes they seem motivated by wishing us ill. But it’s hard to pick one’s way through that distinction, especially when our securities and assumptions are being threatened.  And I’m distrustful of our ability to be fair witnesses on the question of whether those who disagree with us should be treated as genuine debate partners or disingenuous trouble makers.

There’s a strange tale in Midrash Bereishit Rabba about Yaacov from Kefar Neburaya[1]. He seems to be a Rabbi who thinks you need to do Shechitah to eat fish – that fish need to be slaughtered in the same way as animals are slaughtered, with a blessing and a special incision made at the neck. Well, we don’t – as Kosher keeping Rabbinic Jews do Shechitah on fish. But it’s not entirely obvious as to why not. I mean, fish are alive in the same way as chicken are alive. It’s not as if he’s entirely without logic in threatening to tear down the entire apparatus of Kashrut.

But when Rabbi Chagai hears about what Yaacov is up to, he orders him to lie down and beats him. I mean there is a bit of argument, but the argument doesn’t get settled. Poor old Yaacov just gets hit.

Rabbi Chagai’s response to Yaacov is so revealing of how we all feel when we meet someone who’s a bit difficult and awkward and doesn’t accept the same norms as I do. It’s so much easier to deal with difficult people by dealing with them, and not their arguments.

 

I’m deeply uneasy about these kinds of stories. I don’t like the idea that when we disagree the way out of the problem is beating someone, or calling on God to swallow them up, or cancellation.

I suppose the point of the Korach story is that Moses appeals to God to do something so dramatic that everyone will know that Moses is right and Korach is wrong. And indeed God does something utterly dramatic. But, in the world in which I live, I don’t get to see arguments settled by God’s direct intervention. Instead, I get to see plenty of arguments start, and plenty of arguments when people on one side accuse the people on the other side of being disingenuous or worse. And I see plenty of arguments where both sides seem more interested in trying to get the other person to lie down and get beaten rather than engage across the chasm that separates one side and the other. And God? Well God just doesn’t get directly involved in the sorts of arguments I see.

 

It’s something I experience it as a Rabbi all the time. Two people in the community are arguing and I get both sides of the argument. One person explains their position and listening to them, how could I possibly not see that the other person is deliberately seeking to attack them? And then I speak to the other person, and it turns out they just think they are making a perfectly reasonable point and it’s the other person who is the bully. And when God doesn’t get involved how do you escape an ever-more fractured and broken world where we are ever-more drawn into the things that divide us and. Ahhh.

 

So, here are my thoughts about how we can learn to argue better.

Let’s start with this one – every human being is created in the image of God. We are each of miraculous and extra-ordinary and so very, very beautiful – even if you disagree totally with me and my worldview. Can you argue with me as if you really believe I’m created in the image of God? Please.

And then there is a stunning verse in Proverbs - מָוֶת וְחַיִּים, בְּיַד-לָשׁוֹן - The tongue has the power of life and death.[2] Words are so important. Of course, in the Bible, the universe is created by speech. There’s a powerful Kabbalistic idea that every time we speak we create a world around us. Or, for the less mystically inclined, what about the idea from linguistic theory, the Sapir Worff hypothesis, that our language creates and shapes our worldview? When we use language in ways that denigrate those we disagree with we move into being people who … and it gets back to where we just were … fail to see that every human being is created in the image of God.

And one last idea – Shiviim Panim LeTorah[3] - there are 70 facets to the Torah. Or, as I like to think of it, the truth is too complex for my single mind, or anyone’s single mind. And the fact that someone I disagree with might, in my mind, be obviously wrong, or mendacious, or cruel or heartless, or any of that isn’t actually a sign that that is absolutely the case. As Jack Nicholson once told Tom Cruise, I can’t handle the truth. Truth is not something to be handled by any human, it’s something that should inspire in us a certain humility. We would do better reflecting on what we don’t know, than what we think we do. Gedalti Ben HaChakhamim V’Lo Matzati Tov MiShtikah – said the son of the great Rabban Gamiel – I grew up among the wisest, and I’ve found nothing better than silence. Or as a less Rabbinic sage, Bob Dylan, wrote in Back Pages

Yes, my guard stood hard when abstract threats too noble to neglect

Deceived me into thinking I had something to protect
Good and bad, I define these terms quite clear, no doubt, somehow
Ah, but I was so much older then I'm younger than that now

With a humility about our own hold on truth, curiosity is an easy next step, and curiosity draws us into valuing other opinions and views and through that other people. That’s good.

Without it, we are drawn into rejecting the worth of other views, and the people who espouse them. That’s not good.

·      Value people as created in the image of God.

·      Be careful of the power we exercise through speech

·      And be humble in our claims to know truth.

It’s possible to argue well, it’s possible to disagree and through disagreement come to know more and value more people and things. I really believe this; it’s possible to argue well and save the world.

What a prize is in store for us.

Certainly, it beats being swallowed by the earth.

Shabbat Shalom



[1] Bereishit Rabba 7:2

[2] Prov 18:21

[3] B’Midbar Rabba 13:16

Friday, 16 April 2021

Quarantine and the Things That Can Be Seen in the Rain

 

I spent much of yesterday at Moorefields Eye Hospital waiting while my daughter underwent eye surgery – she’s fine, by the way. But, you know, general anaesthetic and all that. It turns out that an eye hospital is an interesting space in which to think about what it means to see.    

And then there is this mess of Covid complication. Here some of us are, in our masks, and others are locked-down in Denmark and unable to travel to this wonderful Bar Mitzvah celebration. And that makes it an interesting time to think about what we have and what we cannot have in this time of almost-time-to-emerge-but-not-yet.

And in the context of all that there is this week’s Torah reading about a strange infectious disease that contaminates and strikes in all kinds of strange ways. It’s a disease that remarkably demands quarantine.

If this strange disease is detected - וְהִסְגִּ֧יר הַכֹּהֵ֛ן אֶת־הַנֶּ֖גַע שִׁבְעַ֥ת יָמִֽים  - The priest shall quarantine the afflicted person.

And so this is what is in my mind this holy Shabbat – a series of associations about quarantine and lock-down and what it really means to see.

This word – וְהִסְגִּ֧יר - translated as quarantine in its appearance in this week’s reading, comes from the same root as the word used when God closes Noah into the ark, way back in the beginning of the book of Genesis. The animals go in two-by-two and then - וַיִּסְגֹּ֥ר יקוק בַּֽעֲדֽוֹ – God closes Noah in the ark while the destruction rages on the other side of the doors of this first Biblical account of lockdown.

There’s no mystery in understanding why and how the rainbow became such an iconic image this time last year, as the first wave of Covid locked us in. The rainbow is a sign of the end of quarantine. It’s the ultimate celebration of what it means to leave lockdown. And we are all so, so ready to be done with lockdown. So I relooked at the verse when the Bible talks about the rainbow of the end of Noah’s lockdown. Here’s the really interesting thing.

אֶת־קַשְׁתִּ֕י נָתַ֖תִּי בֶּֽעָנָ֑ן וְהָֽיְתָה֙ לְא֣וֹת בְּרִ֔ית בֵּינִ֖י וּבֵ֥ין הָאָֽרֶץ

And I have set My rainbow in the clouds, says God in the aftermath of that lockdown, and when that rainbow is seen, God continues in the next verse - וְנִרְאֲתָ֥ה הַקֶּ֖שֶׁת, I will remember My convenant.

Let me do that again – I have set my rainbow in the clouds, and when the rainbow is seen …

Here’s the thing that struck me this week.

The rainbow is referred to as set in the clouds in one verse. And it is seen in the next.

Go with me here.

The rainbow was there before it was seen. What changes is our ability to see it. Sometimes, we see things. Sometimes we don’t. Whether the thing is there or not is quite a different matter.

Of course, from the point of view of physics – that’s exactly true. A rainbow is nothing more or less than light – which is always there. It’s just that sometimes the angle of the sun refracts through the prism of a billion raindrops in such a way that there appears to be seven bands of colour in the sky. But the light is always there, whether we can see it or not. The red and orange and yellow and green and all the rest of them are always there. But we cannot see the spectacular until there is rain. It’s only in rain that we can see this ethereal beauty.

It’s only in rain that we can see ethereal beauty that is there all along.

It’s only sitting in a hospital ward waiting for your daughter to emerge from eye surgery, that you see things, looking out of the window – the way the light falls across the blinds, the way the cars in the narrow street outside perform a sort of dance as they back and forth their way along, gracefully reversing and pulling in and out and flashing their headlights to let one then the other pass. It’s only when your daughter emerges from surgery blinking and bleary that you realise how much you take this life for granted. At least that is what I found, yesterday, at the very wonderful Moorefield Eye Hospital.

There’s a particular kind of brightness in the air, as we emerge from lockdown in this country – I mean it helps that it's Spring and the blossom and the sky and all that. But also, I wonder, if we are all seeing a little more clearly now. On the back of a year of living in quarantine.

I wonder if, if we can possibly see anything other than opportunities lost, parties lost and lives lost, we might be able to see ethereal beauty more clearly as we emerge from lockdown. I wonder if we might be able to see love more clearly, the value of compassion, the fragility of our existence – these things are, of course, always there. But they are ethereal beauties, easily made invisible to our eyes when the light is bright, only becoming visible when the clouds render our lives overcast. Maybe the task of our time is to imprint these ethereal beauties on our hearts, to swear ourselves to remember even when the light gets brighter and it becomes harder to remember what is truly important and truly beautiful in our lives.

What a paradoxical life this is.

There is a gift in quarantine. There is a blessing in lockdown. There is a rainbow-coloured lining in the clouds. The greatest beauty of this extraordinary universe is there always, but the gift of our enclosure is our ability to see it. We would do well to remember that.

Shabbat Shalom

Thursday, 15 April 2021

On Israel’s 73rd Anniversary of Independence

 

 


Israel’s Basic Law mandates that, after an election, the President meets with representatives of each elected political party to ask who they would back as Prime Minister before inviting one MK to form a ruling coalition. With Israel’s electorate balanced so precariously, last week’s meetings took on an intriguing significance when President Rivlin invited in the cameras. At the age of 82, at the end of his term as Head of State, Rivlin took an opportunity to imprint on the leadership of each of Israel’s political parties a vision of what Israel could and must become. Noah Efron, of The Promised Podcast, shared an extraordinary synopsis of the day. I have drawn heavily on his reporting in this post.

 

The President asked the Likud representatives whether a President should consider ethical considerations in considering to whom to offer the opportunity to form a coalition. They responded that such matters should be left to the courts – for who is to say that the President’s ethical compass should overwhelm the expressions of the populace at the ballot box? It was an argument Rivlin accepted as serious and ‘probably correct.’

 

Rivlin, a lifelong Revisionist son of Revisionist parents (political hawk), greeted the Labour representative Omar Bar-Lev – dove and founder of Peace Now - with great warmth. Rivlin served in Israel’s army under Bar Lev’s father. Bar-Lev Senior, Rivlin noted, had danced at Rivlin’s wedding – despite their political difference.

 

When the Joint List group entered Beit Ha-Nasi – the House of the President, Rivlin commended their the decision, after the last election, to recommend a Prime Minister from the Zionist parties; the first time an Arab-Israeli party had expressed support for any Zionist potential Prime Minister. Party leader, Ayman Oded shared his party had ‘taken up the gauntlet,’ demonstrating a desire to be partners in forging Israel’s narrative as a country of both Jews and Arabs.

 

Ra’am MK, Mazen Ghnaim, was also warmly greeted. Ghnaim, previously, was Head of the remarkably successful Bnei Sakhnin Football Club – at a time when Rivlin was Head of Beitar Yerushalayim FC. “My friend,” Rivlin greeted the Islamicist, “We knew back then how to work together, and how to win with teams of both Jews and Arabs.” Rivlin went on to say, “Israeli Arabs are the bridge, the possibility of creating some sort of understanding and mutual trust between the sides, because trust is what will bring peace… These things are etched onto the tablet of my heart as an Israeli citizen and as the son of the translator [into Hebrew] of the Koran.”

 

The headline, the next day, was that, as expected, the President invited Bibi Netanyahu to form a government. But behind the headline – which seemed to reflect only the intractable nature of Israel’s many political conundrums – lay nuance and hope and a willingness to reach out of silos towards a democratic future for a State whose existence and flourishing is so close to my heart. Maybe that is always the case with headlines and the multi-layered reality they both reflect and conceal.

 

Kol Od BLeivav – still in the heart of this Jew lies that great hope – HaTivkvah Bat Shanot Alpayim, of freedom, empathy, security and peace. The seeds that will, please God, eventually become the great cedars of this vision of hope have been planted, nurtured and tended by so many for so many years. To those who have built, and even died to protect, the State whose 73-year-old existence we celebrate today, we salute you. To those for whom the Declaration of Independence represent a disaster – the Nakba – we seek to empathise and respond bravely to your loss, even as we affirm Israel’s right to exist in security. And to the future – we still hope. We will always hope.

 

Yom Ha'atzmaut Sameach

 

 


 

Friday, 2 April 2021

Building Memory and Yizkor (Oh and Minecraft)

 


I'm just back from the funeral of a member.


The deceased had three sons, now in their 60s and 70s, and one is an architect; an architect who built synagogues. 


It had me thinking about the verse Tasu Li Mikdash v’Shechanti Botocham - Make for Me [God] a Sanctuary and I will amongst you.


The verse contains a disjunct


God wants a building NOT to dwell in the building – for God does not dwell in buildings – but rather so God can dwell in people - us.


People can be dwelling places for that which cannot be seen or directly experienced in a way that buildings cannot. For buildings are ultimately ... just buildings, and humans are refractions of the divine encoded into flesh - we are vessels for experiencing.


But the way humans experience, so often, is by encountering buildings, specifically buildings that are designed to infuse and encode into us the sensibilities woven into them as they were built.




And I was thinking about all this in the context of this bereavement – a matriarch who had passed away whose greatest act of building in life was that of a family, not of a literal building, but a figurative one – a figurative building into which she wove her values, values which infused her sons, her grandchildren and great-grandchildren even as they couldn’t be with her; trapped, as they were on the other side of the world; trapped, as she was on the other side of the veil that separates the living from the dead.


Of course, it’s not only architects who build. It’s not even only the engineers and the plumbers and the plasterers and the painters.


Each of us, in our varied professional encounters, and personal encounters, we are all building as we go. Forgive me, this simile might not work for many of you – but we are all avatars in Minecraft pumping out construction before us at every turn. 


What if we were to accept ourselves as building-creatures, always building everywhere we go, always building spaces which embed within those who encounter them the very fabric of the values and norms with which we erect the buildings that survive our disappeared presence?



The human life as a life of building.


Actually, it’s not a new idea.


The end of the first Masechet of the Talmud Bavli, Brachot ends with a Rabbinic re-reading of a verse from Isiah.


Brachot 64

אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר אָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים מַרְבִּים שָׁלוֹם בָּעוֹלָם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְכׇל בָּנַיִךְ לִמּוּדֵי ה׳ וְרַב שְׁלוֹם בָּנָיִךְ״. אַל תִּקְרֵי ״בָּנָיִךְ״ אֶלָּא ״בּוֹנָיִךְ״.

In the original, the prophet suggests that our children, studying about God make for more peace in the world.


In the re-reading Rabbi Chanina is reported to say, don’t say, ‘your children,’ but rather ‘your builders’ – not Banaich, but Bonaich. The Rabbi conflates the human with the builder, for we are, surely, one and the same.

 

I’m reminded too of almost the last reported words of Abraham Joshua Heschel, the great Rabbi of the last century. In an interview just before his death, in 1972, Heschel gave this instruction.


‘Above all,’ he insisted, ‘remember that the meaning of life is to build a life as if it were a work of art. You are not a machine. Start working on this great work of art called your own existence.


Build a life as the great work of art of our existence.


Heschel’s nephew is a member here, of course, and an architect. Perhaps that’s not a coincidence. Of course it's not a coincidence, nothing is ever a coincidence. 

So, what if we were, truly, to see our existence as a great work of art, a building, a building that through our actions and our inactions, shapes and structures the way that those who came into contact with it would be lifted, or crushed, by that interaction. Build a life with holiness and dedication, and we’ll successfully code into those we encounter, holiness and dedication. Build a life with love and we code into those we encounter love.

 

This is the end of the Festival of Pesach, we are standing here at a Yizkor service. And I wonder if the reverse is true. When we think of those we have loved and lost, what is the building they have left behind? It’s us, touched, shaped, borne, of our parents’ great acts of creation. But it’s also the other shapes we see around us when we reflect on what our parents, and those we have loved and lost have left as their markers still, on the other side of their passing.


What are the values and the coding of their Mikdashim? How are we to detect their encouragement to us to live up to the standards of holiness that their life built around us?

 

We’ve been in darkness, and now we are emerging.

We’ve been in Egypt and now are in the wilderness.

We’ve been in lockdown and now we are in – whatever it is – Step 2 stage B.


It’s a good time to build with the intent of inspiring in those who will wander into those buildings holiness, love, the values we would wish to survive us.


And it’s a good time to reflect on the buildings that have formed us, left by those who loved us and formed us. What are the markers of these buildings that we wish to allow ourselves to feel are truly of them, and in so doing, we make their memories a blessing.

Chag Sameach

 --

Photographs are the work of Stanley Saitowitz, http://www.saitowitz.com/

In honour of Zelda Saitowitz of blessed memory

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