Masorti, Modern- and Ultra-Orthodox

A teenage member suggested the following way of thinking of the difference between ourselves, a Masorti congregation, and our fellows in Modern- and Ultra-orthodoxy. I thought it worth a response.

• Ultra-orthodoxy, they suggested, involved a commitment to Halachah coupled with sexism and homophobia.
• Modern-Orthodoxy, in turn, involved a commitment to Halachah without the sexism and homophobia.
• And Masorti involved none of the above.

Hmmm.

I don't quite see it that way.

Being Masorti – from the Hebrew word for passing down a tradition through generations – requires placing oneself in the unfolding history of Judaism as it engages with tradition and change. Masorti Judaism's greatest scholars have tended to be interested in questions such as this; how has Judaism changed as we have travelled through time and space?

Lee Levine – the great scholar of the 1^st Century Judaism – looks at how Judaism changed from being Temple-based and Cohen-led and became Synagogue-based and Rabbi-led. He claims it’s impossible to ignore the fact that, living around Jews as the Temple falls, are Christians who are meeting in prayer houses led by religious leaders who became religious leaders not simply because their fathers were religious leaders before them.

Saul Lieberman – who studied how the Talmud fused together 500 years of oral argument into elegant, written documents – suggested that it’s impossible to ignore the fact that as the Talmud comes into being, Jews are living in a world heavily influenced by Hellenist (Greek) thought (logic and rhetoric). He shows how understanding the influence of Hellenism on Rabbinic development is necessary to understand how Rabbinic Judaism came to be.

Louis Jacobs asks the questions - how and why did Maimonides come to articulate 13 principles of Jewish theology when such a list had never been a part of Judaism. Never before, in Judaism, had the Aristotelian idea that God was the First Cause, been considered. Never before had Judaism invested such great effort in the claim that Moses was God’s most important prophet. Never before had Judaism claimed that the entire Torah was absolutely perfect; even claiming that a verse like “Timnah was a partner of Eliphaz” was as important as “Hear O Israel, Adonai is our God, Adonai is One.” It’s impossible, says Jacobs, to imagine such a list coming into being were it not for the fact that Maimonides lived in the midst of an Arab society that understood and valued Aristotle, claimed that Mohamed (not Moses) was the ultimate prophet and claimed that every word of the Koran was equally Divine.

So, if you are a Masorti Jew, you understand that there is no such thing as a pure and perfect Judaism. You know that Judaism is continually unfolding and developing as it moves through space and time. And this unfolding rhythm not only explains how Synagogue-based Judaism began, and Rabbinic-based Judaism began and Jewish theology began, but can also how Jewish law - Halacha - unfolds and develops. 

One example; Torah reading. In the first two centuries of the Common Era you would read your own Aliyah yourself. The Talmud is quite clear; if you can’t read your Aliyah yourself, you can’t have an Aliyah. If you only have one person in the Shul who can read, ‘That person stands and reads and sits, and stands and reads and sits … even seven times.’[1]

Over 1,000 years later the Shulchan Arukh puts it a little differently. ‘One needs to protest against one who doesn’t know how to read so they do not go up to read from the Sefer Torah. And if you need one who doesn’t know how to read (if they are a Cohen or a Levi and there is no-one else save them), if when the reader reads for them word after word, they know how to repeat it and read it from the written text they can go up. And if not, they should not go up.’[2] Yosef Caro (who died in 1575) sounds as if he is fighting against the notion that Torah reading could be done by a 'Baal Koreh' - a master-reader, on behalf of other people who don't prepare to read their own Aliyot.

Perhaps you can feel the change coming, as you read the Shulchan Arukh, even as Caro argues against the change to how we read the Torah today. Other Halachic leaders, even from before the time of Yosef Caro, make clear that the other option - having a Baal Koreh - was already an established practice. The Rosh (who died in 1327), explains, ‘The thing we do now – where the messenger of the congregation reads – that is so as not to embarrass people who can’t read.’[3]

Halacha is changing, and the cause of the change simply doesn't seem to be a change in the will of God-in-the-heavens, or a change in our understanding of God's will, revealed at Sinai. Rather this seems to be a story of how human beings responded to different values differently in different social and cultural moments in time. Yosef Caro, the Rosh and every religious leader since, have to make a decision about to whom to offer an Aliyah. Either we can keep a tight hold and only allow people who are properly qualified, or we can take a more inclusive approach and find a way to not embarrass people who aren't perfectly good (after all, who is perfectly good). Caro and the Rosh differ on this issue - that's OK, argument is good. But the Rosh’s position wins out in Synagogues across the world, and across all denominations – including the Ultra-Orthodox.

I could share, literally, thousands of similar stories about the reality of Halacha as a developing, living, organic thing; just like every other element of Judaism. Halacha changes over time and space because of social and cultural influence.

So where does that leave Masorti in its relationship with Ultra-Orthodoxy and Modern-Orthodoxy? 

Well, on the one hand, we are friends. At least we should be friends. And all Jews are bound up with one another, so I don’t want to be too rude, but …

This is the story of Ultra-Orthodoxy. They, just like Reform, just like Masorti, are responding to social and cultural change. When Modernity arrives, and Jews are given the opportunity to study in Universities where they might even learn how the Bible itself has a history and a development, the leaders of Ultra-Orthodoxy say, “No thank you.” They don’t want any of the offerings of Modernity. They want to put up a big wall and refuse to allow modernity in. They will even say that “Anything new is forbidden as a Torah rule.”[4] But that approach is radically new – never before had Judaism claimed that anything new was forbidden just because it was new. No Rabbinic Jew is recorded as suggesting that we should live as if the Temple had never fallen! Saying, “No,” to modernity is just as much a response to modernity as saying, “Yes.” 

Claiming that they are doing nothing new (even if that is demonstrably nonsense), Ultra-Orthodoxy claims they are the only people keeping Halacha. But protecting an unchanging thing isn't Halacha. Halacha develops! [6]

Ultra-Orthodoxy declines to respond to new ways of thinking about gender and sexuality because they are stuck in a view of Halacha that is not the reality of Halacha. 

This leaves Modern Orthodox. My friends who are Modern Orthodox have a problem. They want people to think that they are doing things ‘properly’ – actually that’s what the word ‘orthodox’ means, literally – one right way of thinking about things. And it turns out that the people most Modern Orthodox Jews trust to judge whether they are doing things properly are Ultra-Orthodox. That means that even if Modern Orthodox Jews know that Halacha evolves, they have to be incredibly careful about doing anything about it. Because if they look like they are accepting that Judaism can change, they are in danger of crossing any one of thousands of red-lines the Ultra-Orthodox draw. And if they do that, they will find themselves excommunicated, or cursed or … there’s lots of really nasty language used. Again, the question of who should get an Aliyah will serve as a very good example of this issue. 

The Talmud[5] says that the reason women don’t have Aliyot is because it would be a disgrace to the honour of the community. 

Well, that makes some sense if you know that, in Talmudic times, the person having the Aliyah had to read it themselves (which I do), and if you assume that men are more important than women (which I don’t!). If you know this and accept that, then you would surely only want to offer Aliyot to men, and you would surely only give an Aliyah to a woman if there weren't enough men around who could read properly, and that would indeed be very embarrassing - for the men. But if you live in 2020, and you reject any claim that men are more important than women, then you have to believe that NOT giving Aliyot to women would be a disgrace to the honour of the community. That's why almost all Masorti congregations give Aliyot to women.

But giving Aliyot to women is a red-line drawn by the Ultra-Orthodox. That means that a person who identifies as Modern-Orthodox has a choice. They can quieten down and fall into line, or they can say they disagree with the Ultra-Orthodox conception of what Halacha truly is and risk excommunication. Most fall into line. Only a few, like Louis Jacobs, and the founders of New London Synagogue, have the courage to walk away from that whole system to pursue Judaism as they believe it truly is. Most Modern-Orthodox Jews believe the same things most Masorti Jews believe, but they don't want to say it too loudly, for fear that they will be told they aren't Orthodox at all. I can't help but wish all these Masorti-believing Orthodox-affiliating Jews would be bolder, and come and help make Masorti communities stronger. 

Most people identifying as Modern Orthodox wish to respond to new ways of thinking about gender and sexuality, but they are not willing to disagree with how the Ultra-Orthodox control who gets to say how Halacha should react to change. 

Here’s the big problem that faces Masorti. 
It takes too long to explain why we think we are right. There are simpler answers out there, and there are less courageous answers. But that doesn’t mean we don’t accept Halacha, even as we respond to new ways of thinking about gender and sexuality.

Here's the tricky thing. Not much of this much determines who is right in these divergent ways of relating to Halacha and modernity.  That's partly because it's not clear how to judge what 'being right' means. It might be that the Ultra-Orthodox view that concentrating efforts on keeping modernity away from Halacha is the best chance Judaism has of ensuring a Jewish future; with lots of kids and a willingness to exclude anyone who threatens conformity. It might be that Modern-Orthodoxy is right that walking a thin line between accepting change and not threatening the red-lines set by the Ultra-Orthodox will best guarantee a Judaism that can survive in a rapidly changing society. But I've never really been persuaded by arguments that the right kind of Judaism is the one that results in the most number of people committed to that view of religion. I know that numbers are important, but if the goal is to have the largest number of followers of one particular brand of religion, or another, maybe we should all become Muslim?

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[1] Tosefta Megilah 3:12

[2] Shulchan Arukh OH 139:2

[3] Megillah, 21a 3:2

[4] A famous saying of the Chatam Sofer.

[5] Talmud Megillah 23a. I have a full treatment of this issue here. http://rabbionanarrowbridge.blogspot.com/2014/10/my-responsum-on-women-reading-from-torah.html

[6] The best article on this is Michael Silber’s The Emergence of Ultra-Orthodoxy: The Invention of a Tradition, available here https://www.academia.edu/1829696/The_emergence_of_ultra-orthodoxy_The_invention_of_a_tradition

Stubborn and Rebellious Son - Ki Tetze

How To Be a Jewish Judge - Part Two

Devarim 21:18-23

If a man has a ben sorar u’moreh (stubborn and rebellious son) who does not listen to the voice of his father and the voice of his mother and when they discipline him he does not listen to them, then his father and his mother shall seize him and bring him out to the elders of the city and to the gate of his place.  And they shall say to the elders of the city, this son of ours is stubborn and rebellious, he does not listen to our voice, a glutton and a drunkard.   Then, all the people of the city shall pelt him with stones until he dies, and you shall burn out the evil in your midst, and all Israel will hear and fear.

Rashi, based on Sanhedrin 72b

The stubborn and rebellious son is executed on account of [what he will become in] the end. The Torah penetrates to his ultimate intentions. Eventually, he will squander his father’s money, seek what he has become accustomed to, not find it, and stand at the crossroads and rob people [killing them, thereby incurring the death penalty. Says the Torah, “Let him die innocent, rather than have him die guilty.”

Mishnah Sanhedrin 8:1-4

From when does a ben sorar u’moreh become a ben sorar u’moreh?  From when he brings forth two hairs, and until his beard grows around.  As it is said “ben” and not “bat”.  “Ben” and not “ish”.  Little ones are exempt.

From when is he liable?  From when he has eaten a certain measure of meat and drunk a certain measure of Italian wine.  If he ate in a ‘mitzvah gathering’ or ate the second tithe in Jerusalem, or ate non-kosher meat... if he ate anything that is a mitzvah or anything that is a violation of religious law, if he ate any food other than meat, or drank any drink other than wine, he does not become a ben sorar u’moreh, as it is said (Deut 21) “a glutton and a drunkard.”  And even though there is no proof of this there is a hint of it, as it is said (Proverbs 23): “Don’t be among the drunkards of  wine or the gluttons of meat.” 

If his father wants to and his mother does not want, or his father does not want to and mother wants to, he does not become a ben sorar u’moreh unless both of them want to. If one of them was maimed or lame or dumb or blind, he does not become a ben sorar u’moreh, as it is said (Deut. 21): “then his father and his mother shall seize him” – so they are not maimed.   “Bring him out” – so they are not lame.  “They shall say” – so they are not dumb.  “This son of ours” – so they are not blind.

From In The Land of Milk & Honey

They didn’t argue that God knew best, or that human morality was inherently unreliable.
They didn’t answer that we don’t have a choice – that “that’s was the Torah says and who are we to argue?” They realised that leaving our morals at the entrance of the Bet Midrash is not what learning Torah is about, that – to paraphrase the Kotzker – serving the Shulchan Arukh is not always the same as serving God.

David Weiss HaLivni

Even when the Rabbis altered a law, they never abrogated it. They retained the integrity of the law. They did not totally eliminate it. That was necessary in order not to impugn the Lawgiver with a lack of moral sensitivity which may undermine not only this law, but laws in general. Once one has formulated, as in the case of bastardy, mamzerut, the need for changing the law because of moral exigency, any subsequent change will be interpreted as an admission that initially there was no moral sensitivity, imputing to the Lawgiver a defective moral awareness.

Daniel Spitz, CJLS Responsum on Mamzerut

It is true that the rabbis in the past did not explicitly use morality as the basis for change or interpretation of a law. In explaining the Torah's statement "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," for example, the Rabbis of the Talmud offer ten separate hermeneutic proofs that the verse calls for compensation and not mutilation. Each is indirect and tenuous, which explains why so many are offered. Underlying the ingenious arguments is an implicit matter of conscience regarding the taking of body parts.

There is a price paid, however, for only looking inwardly for the justification of change. The hermeneutic rules may fail to provide a comprehensive solution, as in the case of mamzerut. Preserving the system may begin to look more important than acting justly and halakhah may begin to look more like a chess game than a system of religious striving. In the words of Rabbi Gordon Tucker: “Halakhah is a theological legal system. Separating law from moral principle in such a system, as positivists would be wont to do, is to separate moral principles from God, and that is theologically untenable.”

Who Will Teach Me To Wonder? - Sermon Version Shabbat Parah, Parashat Hukkat

Who Will Teach Us To Wonder

When, Jack, you and I sat and thought together about your Devar Torah we went through the piece you read from the Torah scroll. The strange tale of a cow, killed and burnt, whose ashes are sprinkled in the water to make someone ritually contaminated by death ritually pure.

I asked you if there was anything in the story you found interesting. And you said, with characteristic insight and honesty, ‘no.’

So we changed tack, and you got to give a terrific devar torah on the terrific story of the golden calf. And though your devar torah was indeed terrific, it means I’m left with the cow ash.

Thanks.

This tale of cow ash is undeniably odd. It’s odd to imagine there is something contaminatory about death, and odder still to think that ash from a cow, mixed in with cedar and hyssop and scarlet stuff should do anything to remove such an odd affliction. The good news is that I’m not the first person to struggle for a way of relating to all this oddness.

Here’s a Rabbinic text, about a rabbi who was alive 2000 years ago.

An non-Jew asked Rabbi Yochanan Ben Zakkai, ‘This is a bit like witchcraft. You bring a cow, burn it, grind it, take its ashes. If one of you is defiled by a dead body you sprinkle two or three drops on them and say to him, ‘You are pure.’ Rabbi Yochanan asked him, ‘Have you ever seen a man possessed by the demon of madness?’ ‘Yes’ he said. ‘And what do you do? ‘We bring roots and make them smoke under him and then we sprinkle water on the demon and it flees.’ Said Rabbi Yochanan, ‘let your ears hear what you say with your mouth. It is the same for this spirit of uncleanness [and he explains the odd ritual away. But then the Midrash continues]

When the non-Jew left, Rabbi Yochanan’s students said to their master, ‘Master, you pushed off this man with a straw, what explanation will you give to us?’ he said to them, ‘By your life, it is not that death defiles, nor that this water purifies. The Holy Blessed One says, ‘I have laid down a Hok - a decree [it’s not to be understood, it’s something to be followed even though you cannot understand it].[1]

The key word is the Hebrew word hok - something that cannot be understood and isn;t designed to be understood. The ritual of the cow is a Hok. The fact that it doesn’t make rational sense isn’t because it’s stupid and the fact that we - not even Jack - can understand it - isn’t because we - and certainly not Jack - are stupid. Rather this hok is something not to be understood.

I’m interested in what it means to have things, in our lives that we understand, to have things in our lives that we strive to understand and - most of all - what it means to make a space for things that cannot be understood.

I’m aware suggesting we make space for things which cannot be understood is counter-cultural, especially for a Synagogue full of people who understand so many things and quest to understand so much more.

I’ve nothing against the quest to understand. In fact questing to understand the world and everything in it is one of the most exquisite things a person can do with their lives.

I get that there are 37.2 trillion cells in the human body, each one a direct descendent from one single zygote - that’s extraordinary.

I get that every atom in every one of these cells was already present at the very beginning of time and that therefore each of my 37 trillion cells is, in some sense, recycled star dust.

There is nothing wrong with the quest for greater and greater knowledge, and if I had one thing to say to neurologists attempting to understand the nature of brain-damage, or civil engineers attempting to work out how best to build buildings that can withstand the destructive power of an earthquake it would be to say, go, go, go, lives depend on your passion to understand more.

But ...

There is a but.

The but is that as we understand life we have this tendency to turn life into bits of data we can compute, manipulate and control.

And even if there is something out there we can’t understand yet, if we think that this thing is there capable of being understood if we just tried a little harder, we start treating everything in life as a bit of data that can be manipulated and controlled.

We start to think that life can be calibrated and controlled.

And here’s the scary thing for people who like to calibrate and control.

The really important things in life are not quantifiable, they are not measurable and they are certainly not capable of being manipulated like pixels in a computer programme or the spread of bonds and stocks in our investment portfolios.

And the reason the really important things in life are not capable of being manipulated is not that we aren’t clever enough yet.

It’s because the really important stuff in life is beyond control.

The gift of love is not manipulable.

The ability to feel joy isn’t controllable.

You can’t measure artistic worth on a spreadsheet.

Wonder isn’t something that can be programmed.

Really this is all about our ability to appreciate wonder.

There are loads of people telling us to try to understand more, and control more, and learn more. There are loads of people telling us if only we tried a little harder we would do better in these exams or that six-month performance review and all the rest of it.

But who will teach us to wonder?

Who will teach us to appreciate that the world is not ours to control.

It’s ours to protect and serve.

Who will teach us that time isn’t simply a unit of production to be set into a productivity spreadsheet, but rather the essence of human life; time is to be celebrated and marked, not put to the service of commercial gain.

We’ve got the balance wrong - too much seeking to control and not enough wonder about that which is beyond control.

We need more people to teach us about wonder.

It’s a subtle point I’m trying to make,

It’s one thing to work to wipe out polio, or tackle malaria or cure cancer, but somewhere we, in our comfortable Western existence, seem in danger of forgetting that death isn’t something to be eradicated as if it were an infectious disease. Death is at the very heart of what it means to mortal. We can eat more fruit and veg, exercise, treat and cure more and more disease, but we can’t escape what it means to be mortal, unless we turn ourselves into something no longer human. 

Death is a wonder, a Hok, something to defeat understanding. That’s why death is so scary - not because we can’t understand it yet, but because it is beyond understanding.

That’s why we need a ritual to help us deal with our inability to understand death.

That’s why that ritual, itself, needs to escape understanding.

That’s why we need a Hok featuring cow’s ash.

And here’s the real problem of forgetting about wonder and thinking everything falls into the twin categories of controllable and almost controllable;

by promoting the notion of control we strip out our appreciation of wonder from the world.

If we say the really important things in life are the things we can measure and control we are in danger of arriving at our deathbed proud, or ashamed, of the amount of money in our bank accounts.

And no-one arrives at their deathbed counting how much money they have in their bank accounts.

It’s really not about the stuff we can measure.

It’s really about our ability to wonder.

I did something I don’t usually do, when thinking about this sermon.

I googled the question, ‘who will teach me to wonder?’

And there, answer number three was a link to Psalms 119:27.

Let me tell you about Psalms 119:27.

It’s not an easy verse to translate, something like this;

Bring me to understand the path of what you demand of me and I will chat with your wonders.

The leading Rabbinic commentary Malbim points out the importance of it being the PATH of the precepts. It is, for Malbim the path up Mount Sinai, the path that leads beyond human understanding.

We seek an understand of that we know we cannot understand.

It’s a little paradoxical.

We address ourselves to the path up the mountain knowing that there are truths beyond human grasp.

And the reward is we get to be in 'siach' - in conversation - with wonder, with mystery.

We don’t get to understand, we certainly don’t get to control.

But we do get, in fleeting moments of insight, a sense of being in conversation with that which is wonder.

The great American writer, William James, in his Varieties of Religious Experience, tries to explain the sort of momentary encountering of the ineffable that is at the heart of great moments of religious insight. The word James uses is noetic - these are kinds of understanding that cannot be spelt out in letters, they cannot be published as respectable scientific literature or made subject to double blind testing of hypotheses and controls.

Noetic experiences are beyond language, beyond measurement, they are experiences of being in siach - being in conversation with wonder.

When an artist, when asked to explain their painting responds, ‘I can’t really explain it in words, if I could have explained it in words I wouldn’t have had to paint it.’ She is talking about a noetic truth.

And noetic truths might just allow us to make sense of our lives in ways even more important than the quest for measurable knowledge.

So, Jack, all of us, let us do lots of great, inspiring, life-saving science. But let us also keep a place for wonder. Let’s keep looking for opportunities to walk paths that don’t reveal all their secrets even under the most powerful of microscopes. Let’s lift up our eyes to wonder in the hope of a siach - a conversation with that which is noetic - beyond.

Because if we lose the ability to wonder, if we lose the ability to appreciate that which cannot be comprehended, we lose the ability to treasure all that is most special about our humanity.

Shabbat shalom

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[1] Bemidbar Rabbah 19:8

On Cohanim and Converts A Legal Response

As of Sept 22, I've changed my approach to this issue. I've marked with a strikethrough areas of this version of the responsum that no longer apply.

The new reasoning is marked with a purple text background. 

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The Issue

Restrictions on whom a Cohen may marry form part of a pyramid of marital possibilities for Jews. Normal Jews may marry any Jew. Extra restrictions apply to the Cohen and extra restrictions still apply to the High Priest who is only allowed to marry a virgin (Lev 21:13). The more exalted a person’s Halachic status, the more marital restrictions are placed upon them. An almost identical pyramid of restrictions applies to the issue of coming into contact with the dead,[1] and a similar pyramid of restrictions determines who is allowed to enter where in the Temple. In general, this form of increasing restrictions serves as a classically Biblical way of using ritual to carry a religious message. Moreover, at least in theory, I don’t make any claim that there is something unethical or immoral about the prohibition on a cohen marrying a convert, the American constitutional provision that insists that only a person born an American can become President of America is based on a similar sense that, as a matter of theory, our status at birth remains important, even if we change our status in life.

So much for the theory. The problem comes when, in the contemporary world, a male cohen[2] falls in love with a convert or, as is more often the case, a non-Jew who subsequently decides she wants to convert. At the point we, as Masorti Rabbis, meet these couples they have taken a decision to spend the rest of their lives together. They have also, often, been refused a marriage licence by Orthodox B’tei Din and have been placed in a position where they are close to rejecting all, or at least many, forms of traditional Jewish observance and community. There are several possible responses open to a Masorti Rabbi.

i)               Do everything possible to disrupt the relationship in the hope that the newly single Cohen will go on to find a more halachically appropriate spouse.

ii)             Walk away from the couple – what they do is their own business, we will not look to support them.

a.     In the case of a woman who wishes to convert this leaves the Cohen living with a non-Jewish partner and would result in any kids being considered non-Jews.

b.     In the case of a woman who has already converted this leaves the Cohen living with a woman without being married to her.

iii)           In the case of a woman wishing to convert we could accept her application to conversion, but decline to officiate at any chuppah.

iv)            We could accept a candidature for conversion and officiate at the chuppah with joy.

We also need to specify the position that would apply to any children of the marriage.

This is an issue that has attracted some contemporary attention. The Committee on Jewish Law & Standards has passed two responsa on the issue[3] and while both permit members of the Rabbinical Assembly to perform these marriages, they are brief documents and predate the sort of systematic analysis that characterises more recent work. I am however indebted to Klein who identified two key responsa from the Orthodox world. I am also grateful to Rabbi Chaim Weiner who provided me with an unpublished responsum which examines a number of issues relating to the specific role of a Rabbi in this issue.

The Basis of the Prohibition

The key verse on who a cohen may marry is Leviticus 21:7

They shall not take [lo yikchu] a harlotrous and defiled woman [isha zona v’halahah], nor shall they marry one divorced from her husband, for they are holy to their God.

On this verse the early and foundational commentary Torat Cohanim states;

A harlotrous and defiled woman: The Sages say a convert is the harlot that is mentioned here [ain zona ele giyoret][4]

In the parallel Talmudic discussion, BT Kiddushin 78a we find the following;

It was taught, Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai said, ‘A woman who converted aged less than three years and a day is eligible to marry a cohen, as it is said [in the context of a battle against the Midianites, ‘kill every boy and every woman that has known man by lying with him,] but all the young women, who have not known a man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves (Num 31:17&18). And wasn’t Pinchas [a cohen] among them!

            But the Rabbis said, keep them alive for yourselves means as slaves.

Shimon Bar Yochai understands this verse to permit anyone in Israel (including cohanim) to marry a virgin Midianite who (to put it anachronistically) subsequently converts. He argues that this must be so since the Biblical verse permits these women to all the people of Israel, seemingly thereby to include Pinchas and other cohanim.

According to the Rabbis however, this verse from Numbers has nothing to do with who a priest may take as a wife, rather who they may take as a slave. Instead, say the Rabbis in the continuation of the Talmudic passage above, the origin of the forbidden nature of this marriage is a verse from Ezekiel;

And no priest shall drink wine, when they enter into the inner court, and they shall not take widows or divorced women for wives [lo yikchu lehem lnashim], but they shall take virgins of the seed of the house of Israel [betulot mi zera yisrael].[5]

Ezekiel 44:22

Rav Yehudah says both parents must be of Jewish seed.

Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaacov says only one parent needs to be of Jewish seed.[6]

Rabbi Yose says the woman must be one who was conceived [using the root form zera] as an Israelite.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says the woman must have entered into puberty [also using the root form zera] as an Israelite. [7]

The major legal codes (while silent on the relative merits of the claims of Rabbis Yehudah and Eliezer ben Yaacov) reject the position of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai (that a woman who has converted pre-puberty may marry a Cohen) and adopt the position that a convert may not marry a Cohen, even if the conversion took place when the girl was a very young child.[8]

Two Orthodox Responsa

David Tzvi Hoffman d. 1921 came from Romania to lead the Hildesheimer Rabbinical Seminary in Berlin. He is known for an openness to the world of Wissenschaft, academic scholarship, and a willingness to engage with the challenges of modernity, especially around the issue of conversion.

Rav Hoffman[9] examines the case of a non-Jew, married, in civil law, to a Cohen. They have a son who is circumcised, and the woman decides that she wants to convert, marry the father of her child ‘according to the law of Moses & Israel’ and bring up her child as Jewish. [10] Hoffman begins by balancing the relative seriousness of a Cohen either living with a non-Jew or living with a convert. It is hardly a fair fight. The former relationship, in the eyes of Rav Hoffman (citing his father Maharam Shik), is forbidden deoraita – as a matter of Torah law, and its breach is punished by caret – one of the most dramatic punishments in the Rabbinic system. The latter, in Hoffman’s language, and that of his father ‘is not permissible, but only considered as a general prohibition – issur lav.’ On this basis, Hoffman begins by suggesting that converting the woman in order to save the man from caret would ‘certainly be a good thing.’

However, since the Talmud insists that a convert must accept the whole of Torah without exception (Bechorot 30b), it might be thought that converting a woman who wanted to marry a cohen would present a problem since the woman would be converting NOT in order to keep all of Torah. There is a further problem which would apply to a Bet Din which supervised the conversion. They would be acting to allow a sin (the issur lav of allowing the man and woman to live together), and even though this would save the man a greater sin (the caret invoking sin of leaving the man with his non-Jewish partner) there exists a principle that one person should not sin in order to save another from sin. (Shabbat 4a)

From a strict technical perspective, or from a perspective from which Rav Hoffman wishes to protect himself from any suggestion of laxity, Hoffman should clearly turn away from the couple. But he cannot. Hoffman is not a Halachic technocrat and he is prepared to expend ‘spiritual capital’ by engaging in the situation. He finds a technical way of getting round the problems he has identified, but from any kind of objective perspective, it is hardly persuasive. Hoffman states that as long as the woman never explicitly states that she is going to reject the law that prohibits a convert from marrying a cohen she is to be accepted, even in her breach of the law.

Even if we [members of the Bet Din] know that she is going to sin on the matter of this forbidden act, nonetheless for the sake of a repair for the cohen and a repair for his child – taknat hacohen v’taknat zar’o ­– we receive her.

The woman, says Hoffman, should be warned that becoming Jewish results in her, all of a sudden, being held responsible for a range of different obligations that, as a non-Jew, she was not previously obliged to follow, but Hoffman comes close to suggesting that the woman should be told that if she wants to benefit the people Israel, she should be encouraged to convert.

Hoffman also raises the issue of the profanation of God – hillul hashem – if the woman is not to be accepted. If the woman is turned away from her serious wish to convert – even if she would wish to live with or marry a cohen – she could be led to feel that ‘Israel do not care – merachamim – for non Jews.’ This seems so shocking a possibility as to urge Rav Hoffman to action.

But what about a wedding ceremony? Rav Hoffman doesn’t go this far.

Even if we accept her as a convert, we don’t officiate at the wedding with the Cohen … This being the case, it is better that she should live with her husband [baalah] in a civil marriage than there should be a religious ceremony.

In Rav Hoffman’s balancing act the desire to save a Jewish man from caret coupled with the desire to bring the child into the Jewish people outweighs the complexities of accepting for conversion a woman who wants to marry a cohen. But, for him, the desire to bring the Jewish couple under a chuppah, thereby saving the couple from the general issur of living with a partner without kiddushin, does not overweigh his commitment to the obligation that a cohen should not marry a convert. Ad can leshono – this is his perspective on the issue facing us.

Rav Judah Leib Zirelson, d. 1941 was Chairman of the first international conference of Agudas Yisroel, an early religious Zionist and Chief Rabbi of Kishinev – a position that even saw him serve in the Romanian Parliament. He died in a Nazi air attack on the city he served.

The question posed to Zirelson[11] is perhaps even sharper than that facing Rav Hoffman.[12] There is a couple who wish to spend their life together and, with the preparations for the wedding well underway, it emerges that the bride is a convert and the groom a cohen (or more likely someone points out the halachic problem with planned union, this not previously having been realised). The wedding is promptly cancelled and uproar ensues. The author of the question states, ‘what a racket …everyone from the greatest to the smallest [is appalled].’ The questioner reports that the groom threatens, ‘“I will accept baptism in front of everyone and will get married that way for there is no way I will leave my beloved.”’

Zirelson is most anxious to ensure that his response is not to be relied on as a general change in Halachah. ‘This is a one off decree – horat shah – in legislating a case as extreme as this … Do not learn from this any leniency any other issue relating to converts and cohanim.’ But he is prepared to permit the ceremony.

Zirelson begins by considering a Talmudic passage.

There was a female [heathen] slave in Pumbedita who was being kept for immoral purposes. Abbaye said, ‘If it wasn’t for the fact that Rav Yehudah has said in the name of Shmuel that one who frees a [heathen] slave sins, I would force her master to make a declaration of freedom for her.’

Rabina said, ‘Rav Yehudah would agree [with forcing the master to free her], because of the forbidden nature of what is happening currently [mishum milta d’isura].

Gittin 38a

Sinning (by freeing the slave) in order to prevent others from sinning (by having sexual relationships with the woman), of course, raises the problem that confronted Rav Hoffman, namely that a person should not sin in order to merit one’s fellow.[13] Zirelson responds to this by making explicit something that has to be deduced implicitly from Rav Hoffman’s work; namely that this prohibition is not absolute, but rather depends on the relative seriousness of the prevented sin, or, equally, the relative importance of any mitzvah that becomes possible if such a sin is committed. ‘In essence,’ states Zirelson, ‘the thing depends on the greatness of the mitzvah – haikar talui hadavar binyan mitzvah rabah’ Indeed, as Zirelson notes, this is clear from the continuation of the Talmudic passage.

Rav Yehudah has said in the name of Shmuel that one who frees a slave sins… An objection was made since, on one occasion Rabbi Eliezer came into the synagogue and didn’t find ten there, so he immediately freed his slave to make up the ten. [The Rabbis hold] where there is a mitzvah to be performed[14] this is different.

Gittin 38b

In a parallel recounting of the story of Rabbi Eliezer and his slave the Talmud asks,

But isn’t this a case of a mitzvah on the back of a sin – mitzvah habah baveyrah![15] Nonetheless this prohibition does not apply in the case of a mitzvah of the many – mitzvah derabim shani.

Brachot 47b

In attempting to apply this exception to the case of the cohen and his beloved one might, quite legitimately, feel that the case of a single cohen is not one of ‘a mitzvah of the many,’ that said Zirelson is prepared to take a very bold approach to this phrase considering the case of a single individual who has a lifetime’s possibility of fulfilling mitzvot associated with marriage ahead of him as included by this phrase.[16]

Zirelson is as aware as Rav Hoffman of the problem of a good deed being done on the back of a sin, but his weighing up of the relevant issues takes him to a very different place. If, says Zirelson, it is appropriate to override the law against freeing a heathen slave in order to allow nine people to be able to pray as a minyan on a one-off basis, then how much the more so it is correct for a wedding to go ahead that would allow the cohen and his fiancée to come together in married life.[17]

This is a very bold piece of halachah, using the issue of freeing a slave to overturn a well established halachic principle and one that may be considered a matter of Torah-law - d’oraita (though Zirelson, citing various sources,[18] considers it a Rabbinic proclamation - d’rabanan). I wonder if the Rabbi is moved by the way the codes treat the issue of freeing the slave, even though he does not cite these texts directly.

It is permissible to free a slave in order to do a mitzvah, even a Rabbinic mitzvah such as when there are not ten in the Synagogue… and similar cases. Equally a female slave that the people are treating as a free-for-all – shenehagim bah ha’am minhag hefker – behold she is a stumbling block to sinning so you force the master to free her so she can get married and the stumbling block be removed and similar cases.

Rambam MT Hil Avadim 9:6[19]

The emphasis in the Rambam, particularly in the context of freeing the woman, is on removing a stumbling block that results in immoral behaviour and instead allowing a marriage that brings the possibility of holiness. This seems, precisely, to be the motivation driving Rav Zirelson.

I am reminded of the Talmudic passage about the yeshivah student who is about to bed a prostitute when he is slapped about the face by his own tzitzit. As the student attempts to run off, the prostitute, astounded by his resolve, gets him to write for her the name of his Bet Midrash and heads off to find him again. She arrives and asks Rabbi Hiyya;

‘Rabbi, command me so they will make me a convert’.

‘My child’, he replied; ‘perhaps you have set your eyes on one of the students?’ She took out the note and gave it to him.’

He responds ‘Go, enjoy your acquisition’.

And those very bed-clothes which she had spread for him [in the whorehouse] she now spread out for him lawfully.

Menachot 44a

By the standards of any traditional approach to conversion Rabbi Hiyya seems more than a little over-eager and we should not understand this tale as recounting normative halachah on conversion, but it does show the Rabbinic desire to do anything possible to bring an end to harlotrous behaviour, including bending conversion rules and, in the case of Rav Zirelson at least, permitting this wedding. It would be a serious mistake to consider Rav Zirelson abdicates a concern with Halachah, as he rides roughshod over the specific prohibition of a cohen marrying a convert. It is rather that he is anxious to support the institution of marriage and the obligation to ‘be fruitful and multiply,’ moreover he seems to be wishing to avoid losing the cohen as a Jew. He defends Halachah even as he seems to disregard it. That said Zirelson is quite categorical that his leniency in this one-off specific instance should not be relied upon in general. He is minded by the fact that the wedding had already been planned, that the groom is threatening apostasy and by a fear that refusing the wedding would promote anti-semitism in the community who sought his help. We therefore, need to look further for a more general approach.

Converts, Cohanim, Assumptions, Doubt and Probability

The key explanation of the problematic verse Leviticus 18:21 – ‘the convert is the harlot that is mentioned here,’ – is, as stated above, found in the Mishnah. In a Tosafot on that Mishnah[20] the prohibition against marrying a convert is explained.

The reason is that anyone coming from a place of idolatry [shebah min haovdei kokhavim] is steeped in depravity [shutafim bzimah].

This commentary goes on to make the surprising statement that;

A female convert is forbidden [to a Cohen] because of the prohibition of marrying a zonah even if she herself has not acted in a harlotrous manner [af al gav d’lo zintah].

There are two ways to understand this important statement. One is to consider that, in forbidding a convert to marry a cohen, the Rabbis have abandoned any connection to any notion of actual harlotry, rather equating the terms ‘convert’ and ‘harlot’ without any pejorative comment whatsoever. This seems a forced reading and I do not accept it.

A better ‘pshat’ reading is to consider that the Rabbis wished to forbid all converts from marrying cohanim without wishing to defame specifically, any particular convert. Instead, surely, they relied on their belief, that such is the level of depravity in the general non-Jewish world that one ought to assume a pervasive level of harlotry which would make it unsafe to allow any convert to marry a cohen.[21] I wish to engage with this issue in two ways, substantially and technically.

Are Converts ‘Steeped in Depravity’?

From a substantial perspective, it seems wholly impossible to treat the contemporary non-Jewish world with the kind of deep-rooted revulsion that would lead a person to consider all non-Jews ‘steeped in depravity'. Yes, there are issues with contemporary sexual mores and norms, but that kind of blanket approach to all converts (even if it was merited in classical times) now rings untrue. In the sort of situation that confronts a Masorti Rabbi – that of being asked to celebrate a wedding of a pre-existing relationship – rejecting the convert as ‘steeped in depravity’ seems particularly bizarre, not least since the bride and groom are, almost by definition, in the same stage of a relationship – one with the other.

Moreover, from a technical perspective, the blanket accusation that all converts are to be considered ‘steeped in depravity’ seems to contradict the command to love the ger – stranger or convert. Maimonides’ letter to Ovadiah the Convert contains our tradition’s most forceful articulation of the point;

You must know the greatness of the obligation that the Torah imposed on us regarding the foreigner: we are commanded to honor and fear one's father and mother; regarding the prophets - to heed them… But, concerning the ger - convert, we are mandated to bear them great love, with the full force of our heart's affection: You must also show love to the foreigner (Deut. 10:19), just as we are bidden to love His name, as it is said: You shall love the L-rd your G-d (Deut. 6:5).

This demand to love comes with a ‘thou shall not’ obligation attached.

One cannot say to a convert, ‘remember the actions of your ancestors.’ As it is written, you shall not wrong or oppress a ger. (Ex22)

Mishnah BM 58b

One wonders what could be a more significant reminder of a person’s foreign-ness and a supposed past of ‘harlotry’ than refusing them marriage.[22]

We are therefore looking at two opposing trends in Halachic thought. One which insists we love and do nothing to hurt the ger. And the other which associates all converts with idolatry and harlotry. To apply Rav Zirelson’s approach we have to weigh up these mutually exclusive approaches. Since the first approach is enforced specifically by the language of the Torah itself some 36 times and since the second is a Rabbinic derivation, based on a verse in the prophetic works and a series of assumptions that cannot be applied in good faith to converts today one might argue that we have enough even at this point to permit the marriage.

Personally, I would consider this ‘balancing act’ in itself rather than overturning the tradition in its own right instead sets the bar for any change in approach. We are to bend over backwards to find a way to welcome the convert, but we still need a technical loophole that can be exploited to address the prohibition as it is recorded in our texts.

One possibility emerges from an engagement with the language of the Tosafot which states;

The reason [for prohibiting a cohen from marrying a convert is] that anyone coming from a place of idolatry [shebah min haovdei kokhavim] is steeped in depravity.

Most Rabbis do not consider most converts to come from places of idolatry at all. The major source for the relationship between contemporary non-Jewish religious practice and idolatry or avodah zara is another Tosafot, right at the very beginning of the Talmud’s major treatment of this issue. Here the concern is with avoiding engaging with idol worshippers in the three days before and after their ‘eid’ or religious festival. The problem is particularly severe if one considers Sunday a Christian eid. That would make any business between Jew and non-Jews impossible seven days a week (as the authors of this Tosafot make explicit.) The Rabbis[23] find a way to consider monotheistic religious practice other than Judaism, admittedly ‘a rejection of holiness,’ but nonetheless not really avodah zara. It is a deeply pragmatic worldview and also articulates an important theological message about Christianity. I would argue that if one is prepared to consider a practising Christian as not really engaged in avodah zara the same would surely be true of converts who grew up devoid of any religious practice. [24]

A further loophole emerges from an engagement with the notion that the root of the prohibition lies in the requirement that a priest marries only one of the seed of the House of Israel. (Ezekiel 4:22 discussed above). Since the 11^th Century, it has been clear that the convert is considered a member of the House of Israel. Indeed the convert is considered to have the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Israel) as their own forefathers or progenitors. Again the most forceful articulation of this idea is Maimonides’ letter to Obadiah.

All who embrace Judaism until the end of all generations, and all who profess the unity of the Lord's name as is directed in the Torah, are like pupils of Abraham of blessed memory and are members in his household, all of them; … The result is that Abraham our forefather was the father of his legitimate progeny who follow the path forged by him, and he, too, is father to every ger who converts[25]…For after having entered the Jewish fraternity and accepted Judaism, there is no difference between you and us, and all the miracles that were wrought were wrought for us and for you... There is no distinction or incongruity between you and us in any respect.

In other words, if we take Maimonides seriously the convert is considered ‘of the seed of the House of Israel,’ even if they were born and raised as non-Jews. This is a radical rejection of the approach of the classical Rabbinic period (and indeed Maimonides' inclusion of the ban of marriage between Cohen and convert in his legal code), but Maimonides’ statement that ‘there is no distinction or incongruity between you and us in any respect’ weighs very heavily with me.[26]

Admittedly these are not crushing proofs, and all other things being equal, they would not allow for the overturning of an ancient and well-attested traditional observance. But all other things are not equal. We are, today, particularly mindful of the injustice of applying an assumption of harlotry and pre-existing idol worship to all converts. We are anxious to strengthen the institution of marriage for those who are living together without the blessings of chuppah and we are particularly anxious to allow Jewish males to find a way to live their lives with their beloved free of any suggestion of ‘marrying out.’ The balance of proof, for a technical solution to our problem, has been set in such a way to welcome any way out of this problematic issue. I hold, therefore, that this provides us with the loophole that allows us to yield to the tremendous tug to ‘love’ and ‘not oppress’ the convert, and thereby officiate at the wedding.

To Celebrate with Joy?

The question of whether this wedding should be celebrated with full joy or with some diminution need not delay us. The houses of Hillel & Shammai debate how to celebrate the wedding of an ugly bride, Shammai wants us to ‘tell it like it is.’ Hillel demands we sing forth of the ‘beauty and grace’ of the bride – the implication being that we should celebrate a bride’s beauty even if she is ugly.[27] Halachah follows Hillel, as does the popular wedding song, ‘How does one dance before the bride – with a voice of delight and a voice of happiness.’ As well as being impractical and unsustainable, it is halachically inappropriate and even cruel, to allow any concerns about the thin ice on which we tread on an issue like this to impair what must be a day of untarnished joy. 

Officiating at the Chuppah – even if one takes the position that the wedding of a convert and a cohen is prohibited.

Rabbi Chaim Weiner, in an unpublished paper on a related issue, notes that the celebrant is in an unusual position. They are not being asked if they approve, as a matter of halachah, of the union of cohanim and those cohanim are forbidden to marry. They are being asked to officiate at a ceremony celebrating the relationship between two people who, at the time of the conversation, are already committed to spending the rest of their lives together.

The question facing the Rabbi in this case is not “Is a Cohen allowed to marry [this person]?” but rather “Should a Rabbi perform this marriage even if it is forbidden?” It is not a question of what is permitted, but rather - what should be done… The marriage will take place anyway. The children will be born anyway. Our refusal to perform the marriage will not prevent a Cohen from marrying a [this person]. Our only achievement will be driving another couple away from us, more alienation, less understanding.

This alone gives sufficient reason in my eyes to perform the marriage. When the only result of enforcing Jewish law is to lose another Jew, when nothing else is achieved, it is preferable to ignore that law in hope that many more will be observed in the future.  I do not say that a Cohen is allowed to marry [this person]. When approached, I advise the candidate of this fact. However, I do not use my position of power to coerce a non-observant Jews to abide by the law. I accept his decision and accept him as a member of my community with love and respect. I do not compromise my own principles. It is not forbidden to perform these marriages - it is forbidden to enter into them.[28] I choose to be lenient in this case because it is a situation in which I cannot win.

If we accept Rabbi Weiner’s argument (and I do) we should officiate at these celebrations even if we are not prepared to consider the marriage of a cohen and a convert sinless.

The Status of the Marriage and any Children

If such a wedding does take place kiddushin tosfin – the marriage holds. This is best illustrated by the clear insistence if, God forbid, there was a falling out in years to come, a get – ritual divorce, would be required.[29]

The child of a cohen and a convert is considered a full Jew, but a halal,[30] and, as such, should not receive first aliyah nor engage in the other rights and responsibilities of a cohen. While there is enough of an opening to allow the marriage, I do not feel the same imperative applies to the issue of the status of any children who are, according to all authorities, recognised as full Jews, with exactly the same rights and responsibilities of all Israelites.

I’ve changed my mind. I want to improve a religious legal decision - Psak Halachah – I wrote when I first joined New London Synagogue. The original version of this responsum is available here. Orthodox synagogues, in the UK certainly, will not support the conversion of the partner of a Cohen and will not allow weddings between Cohanim and converts and I had received a number of enquiries from non-Jewish and recently converted Jews looking to know if I would apply the same approach.

I demonstrated, in that responsum, that the normative Halachic stance of British orthodoxy is based on a, frankly, horrendous attitude towards converts. There is an assumption that ‘depravity’ – Zimah - is embedded in converts from their birth – even if they convert as minors, even if there is no proof of any depraved action on their behalf.  I also discussed two fascinating responsa of leading Orthodox decisors who, I think correctly, set the prohibition in a category where the realities of lived experience– rather than an absolute blanket-ban refusal -  allowed for a different approach in, admittedly, very limited circumstances.

Based on the unacceptability and un-applicability of the attitude towards converts in the classic sources, I held that it was permitted to welcome converts who were partners of Cohanim, and to celebrate their weddings. Such weddings were not to be seen as second-rate or errant. I’ve had the honour to celebrate a number of such weddings of the past decade and a half. I’m proud to have done so. And at this point there are children of these couples growing towards maturity.

When it comes to the children of a convert and a Cohen, the Mishnah, and all codes state that the status of the child of a such a wedding, owing to the error – Aveirah - of the marriage, is set by the nature of the error – Pigmah – and become Hallalim – full Jews, but not Cohanim; not bound by the restrictions of the priesthood and not able to receive first Aliyah / bless the community in services etc.

In my original responsum, I followed the approach of the Mishnah to the children of marriage between a Cohanim and a convert. At the time, I felt that rejecting the normative Halachic approach to officiating at conversions of partners of Cohanim and subsequent weddings was as radical as I felt able to be. I was aware that, for many Cohanim, not having their children be considered Cohanim was a source of pain, but I didn’t think through a central logical contradiction of my position, or fully realise what I know now – knowing some of these families for over a decade.

Here is the language of Mishnah Kiddushin

כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ קִדּוּשִׁין וְאֵין עֲבֵרָה, הַוָּלָד הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַזָּכָר. וְאֵיזֶה, זוֹ כֹהֶנֶת, לְוִיָּה וְיִשְׂרְאֵלִית שֶׁנִּשְּׂאוּ לְכֹהֵן וּלְלֵוִי וּלְיִשְׂרָאֵל.

וְכָל מָקוֹם שֶׁיֵּשׁ קִדּוּשִׁין וְיֵשׁ עֲבֵרָה, הַוָּלָד הוֹלֵךְ אַחַר הַפָּגוּם. וְאֵיזוֹ, זוֹ אַלְמָנָה לְכֹהֵן גָּדוֹל, גְּרוּשָׁה וַחֲלוּצָה לְכֹהֵן הֶדְיוֹט, מַמְזֶרֶת וּנְתִינָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל, בַּת יִשְׂרָאֵל לְמַמְזֵר וּלְנָתִין.

In a fully acceptable marriage, the status of the father sets the status of the child. In a marriage involving a sin, the error determines the status of the child.

The reason the Mishnah, and subsequent codes, consider the child of a Cohen and a convert to be a Hallal is that the wedding between the parents is sinful. In my original responsum, I argued that such a wedding isn’t sinful; to apply the term ‘Aveira’ to such a category, regardless of any evidence of depravity, is untenable. And if there is no Aveira in the marriage, then there is no Pigmah that could determine the status of the child. Therefore the correct part of the Mishnah for determining the status of the child of such a marriage should be the first paragraph – the child follows the status of the father.

I hold that the children of Cohanim and converts should be considered Cohanim, obliged by the same restrictions that apply to the Cohen and able to serve as Cohanim in ritual matters.

iii) Should a Cohen Who Marries a Convert Still Be Considered a Cohen?

The key text on this is;

A cohen who came to accept the things of priesthood, apart from one thing, we don’t receive him as it says He, among the sons of Aaron, who offers the blood of the peace offerings, and the fat, shall have the right shoulder for his part. This means all the rituals are passed on to the sons of Aaron and any cohen who does not accept this has no part in the priesthood.

Bechorot 30b

Again I would say that while there is room to permit the wedding, it relies on technicalities and is justified only because other issues demand it. I would therefore apply this passage from Bechorot and insist that any cohen married to a convert should step back from the rights and responsibilities of the priesthood, in particular the right to duchen and receive the first aliyah. [31] I acknowledge that this may prove a major emotional wrench for many cohanim but it is an appropriate way of recognising the traditional approach to this issue while still allowing the wedding to be celebrated with joy. While this may be painful it should be noted that any children of the marriage would grow up not to expect, inaccurately, that their father’s role in ritual service would devolve to them. They would grow up seeing their father and mother taking the same role in ritual service that they may grow into themselves.

If the assumption of depravity in the relationship between the Cohen and the convert cannot be considered applicable, then it cannot be correct that the love between the Cohen and the convert should be considered a rejection of one element of the responsibilities of being a Cohen.

I hold that a Cohen should continue to serve as a Cohen if they marry a convert.

A Path Not Taken

Some discussions of this issue focus on the issue of ‘the doubtful cohen,’ that is the notion that since we are unsure as whether any presenting Cohen really is the direct patrilineal descendant of Aaron, without any marriage to any person who might result in the children becoming halalim, it is possible to deem a presenting cohen who wants to marry a convert a non-cohen and perform the wedding. I feel uneasy with this approach which comes close to destroying the entire fabric of the cehunah. Deeming, for example, one brother a non-cohen for the sake of his marriage would mean that one ought to deem his other brothers equally non-cohanim. Rather than destroy the institution of the cehuna, it seems more honest and far more preferable to engage with the outmoded, unsustainable and unjust issue of deeming all converts harlots.

Summary & Practical Considerations

• A candidate for conversion who wishes to convert should not be turned away if she wishes to marry a Cohen.
• We should officiate at the weddings of cohanim and converts.
• These weddings should be celebrated with delight and happiness.
• We take these positions since;
• When weighing the relative merits and problems involved in a couple living together  as Jew and non-Jew (or even as a Jewish couple outside of marriage) and comparing them to the merits and problems of getting married, or officiating at the marriage, the latter is persuasive.
• Per Rav Hoffman & Rav Zirelsohn.
• Performing the wedding removes a great stumbling block to sinning and supports the institution of marriage.
• See discussion of MT Hil Avadim 9:6 in the context of Zirelson.
• We consider that walking away from these couples creates a problem in the context of the Torah’s repeated commands to love and not oppress the ger – convert.
• See discussion of Deut 10 & Ex 22.
• We reject that contemporary coverts should automatically be considered, in their previous life, ovdei avodah zara – idol worshippers.
•  See discussion of Tos AZ 2a DHM assur.
• We reject a contemporary application of the tradition’s blanket assumption of harlotry, applied to all converts.
• See discussion of Tos Yev 61a DHM v’ein zona in the context of Maimonides’ Letter to Ovadiah.
• The children of these marriages are considered fully Jewish but ‘mehalalin’ – the ritual responsibilities and privileges of the priesthood do not apply to them. The children of Cohanim and converts should be considered Cohanim, obliged by the same restrictions that apply to the Cohen and able to serve as Cohanim in ritual matters.
• The husband, once married, should no longer serve as a priest, stepping back from taking first aliyah etc. They are, of course, to be welcomed as a full member of the community in all other respects. should continue to serve as a Cohen.

Addendum - Sept ‘08
Recent activity in the Ultra-orthodox community, especially in the Rabbanut HaReishit in Israel, has complicated matters regarding children. Halachah is clear that the children of a convert and a cohen are Jewish. As I understand matters, however, the Israeli Chief Rabbinate has been retro-actively deeming even conversions under Orthodox auspices invalid when a convert subsequently ‘demonstrates their lack of fidelity to Halachah by marrying a cohen. In other words, according to this (in my opinion) erroneous approach the convert is stripped of her Jewish status by marrying her beloved and children born to the couple are therefore not to be considered Jewish. This is not my approach nor has it been the approach of much contemporary orthodoxy.

Addendum  - Aug '16
I'm enormously grateful to Josh Weiner who passed on this reference to a Ketubah, issued by the Orthodox, United Synagogue, of London (not to be confused with the USCJ), celebrating the marriage of a Cohen and a convert at the Bayswater Synagogue of London!
HaDavar Tzarich Iyun

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[1] Normal Jews have no restrictions, cohanim can only ‘profane themselves’ in the case of immediate kinsmen (Lev 21:3) and the High Priest cannot mourn even his own parents (Lev 21:11).

[2] There is no barrier on daughters of cohanim marrying male converts, see Mishnah Sotah 3:7.

[3] The first passed in 1967 is also published in I. Klein Responsa and Halakhic Studies (1975). The second can be found at http://rabbinicalassembly.org/teshuvot/docs/19912000/goodman_marriageconvert.pdf.

[4] See also Mishnah at Yev 61a (references, throughout, to Talmudic tractates are to the Babylonian Talmud).

[5] Underlined emphases throughout are my own.

Note that in Tos Yev 61a DHM v’ein zona this ‘prooftext’ from Ezekiel is dismissed as an asmachata, presumably so that the issur can be considered d’oraita (no proof text beyond the superficially vague,  but penteteuchal Lev 21:7 being considered to provide a more weighty prohibition than a verse from Neviim). The issue of whether the prohibition should be seen as d’oraita or d’rabanan is one we will return to. I will follow Zirelson who assumes it to be d’rabanan, see discussion below.

[6] The biblical verse states zera and not zerai the plural form. Note the case of a woman born to a Jewish father and non-Jewish mother. She would clearly need to come to a Bet Din to convert but, at least according to Rabbi Eliezer Ben Yaacov, would nonetheless be permitted to a cohen.

[7] Reworded to aid clarity.

[8] Rambam MT Issurei Biah 18:3 & Haggahot Maimoniot ad loc., SA EH 6:8.

[9] Melamed L’ho’il 3:8.

[10] Hoffman makes sure that the woman knows that the child cannot be considered Jewish, even though he has been circumcised, he will need to come to Bet Din and mikvah.

[11] Mechkarei Lev 72

[12] Although the scholars were contemporaries it does not appear that either was aware of each other’s responsum.

[13] See above (Shabbat 4a).

[14] In this case the mitzvah of allowing a fully constituted quorum for prayer.

[15] This is a well attested Rabbinic prohibition that prohibits, for example, a person from using a stolen lulav to fulfil the obligation to take a lulav on Shabbat.

[16] Perhaps he wilfully re-interprets the phrase mitzvah derabim not as ‘a mitzvah for many people,’ but rather as ‘many mitzvot.’ But this is neither the ‘pshat’ sense of the Talmudic passage nor is it an comfortable application of grammar.

[17] Zirelson, in his treatment seems to focus less on the sin of an unmarried couple living together and less on any sin that might apply to a celebrant of marriage, and more on the possible mitzvot that marriage allows both the man and woman to celebrate, particularly being fruitful and multiplying, an obligation he acknowledges as a mitzvah rabbah – great.

[18] Including Tos Yevamot 61a DHM zona, Hidushei HaRashba ad loc. Note also that the prooftext is NOT the verse from Leviticus, but Ezekiel.

[19] See also SA YD 267:79 which uses identical terminology.

[20] Yevamot 61a DHM v’ein zona.

[21] The notion of the Rabbis making presumptions based on the pervading majority of a surrounding society has clear precedent. The classic example is of ‘nine stores’ Pes 9b. In a neighbourhood with nine kosher butchers and one butcher who sells treif, any meat found in the street is deemed kosher. The child of a woman who has been raped is considered to have a status dependent on the majority of the men in the town where the abominable action took place (Mishnah Ketubot 1:10). A person arriving at a city on erev Shabbat who sees lights from far off may say the Sabbath blessing over the lights if ‘the majority of inhabitants of the city are Jewish’ Brachot 53a.

[22] Indeed being forbidden marriage is the marker of the clearest instance of Judaism denying a person entry into the community of Israel – mamzerut.

[23] Tos AZ 2a DHM assur.

[24] For a similar approach to Islam see Maimonides’ letter to Obadiah who converted from that religion.

[25] Note also the classic nomenclature of a convert - ploni ben avraham avinu – so and so, the son of Abraham our patriarch..

[26] I suppose it is, however, just about conceivable that since there is no prohibition on a male ger marrying a female cohenet he didn’t feel the need to mention this exception to his male correspondent.

[27] Ketubot 16b-17a

[28] This distinction is based on the opinion of Rava, that the transgression is committed on consummation of the marriage, and not by the act of marriage itself. Kiddushin 78a (footnote in the original).

[29] The position of British Orthodox Betei Din on this issue is a little more complex. It might be that if such a wedding was performed by a Masorti rabbi they would not insist on a get deeming the wedding null by dint of the Rabbis who officiated. I suspect they would probably insist on a get, even while rejecting the validity of the marriage, but claim no particular expertise on this specific issue.

[30] Mishnah Kiddushin 3:12

[31] The cohen would take other aliyot and should be considered as a full member of the community in all respects, just not a cohen.